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ABSTRACT
As president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Martin Luther King Jr.
emerged as America’s most prominent civil rights activist during the late 1950s and the 1960s.
Due to his eloquent speeches and ability to organize large-scale nonviolent protests, King
inspired numerous individuals to participate in a grassroots movement for equal rights. After
earning two landmark victories with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, King and his SCLC colleagues shifted the focus of their work to improving
economic opportunities for America’s poor citizens. To combat poverty, King planned an
ambitious protest designed to force Lyndon Johnson and the U.S. Congress to face the stark
reality that millions of Americans remained impoverished. Yet an assassin killed King weeks
before the launch of his Poor People’s Campaign. As a result, Ralph David Abernathy, King’s
designated successor, inherited the daunting task of leading the largest direct action campaign
since the Voting Rights March three years earlier. In addition to directing the campaign,
Abernathy encountered a series of unfavorable circumstances as he attempted to advance King’s
goal of eradicating poverty by fundamentally altering America’s economic and political systems.
These circumstances included a poor relationship with Johnson and his successor, Richard
Nixon, internal dissension within SCLC, and increasing apathy from the American public.
Despite these obstacles, Abernathy fought to keep SCLC and the civil rights movement alive for
nearly a decade. In order to understand the diminishing influence of the movement in the 1970s,
one must examine Abernathy’s tumultuous tenure as SCLC president.
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INTRODUCTION
In the frantic hours after an assassin’s bullet struck Martin Luther King Jr. on the balcony of
Memphis’ Lorraine Motel, Ralph David Abernathy struggled to process the sudden death of his
closest friend. When a reporter questioned Abernathy about the details of King’s death, the cofounder of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) failed to provide any response.
A follow-up question prompted Abernathy to describe the details of his first encounter with King
in Montgomery fourteen years earlier, yet he ignored the reporter’s requests for a statement on
the riots that broke out in cities across America that evening. 1
For Abernathy, King’s sudden death brought on more than the usual feelings of grief and
despair that accompany the loss of a dear friend. It meant that he had to take over King’s post as
SCLC president and guide the organization just as the focus of the civil rights movement shifted
from legal equality to enhanced economic opportunity. Although King recognized the need to
implement a succession plan for the SCLC in the event of his incapacitation, planning for such a
morbid scenario unsettled Abernathy. In fact, when King first broached the subject more than
three years before his assassination, Abernathy tried to talk him out of officially designating a
successor. When he saw that King had no intention of leaving the matter unresolved, Abernathy
suggested Andrew Young and Jesse Jackson as worthy candidates to potentially follow King as
SCLC president. According to Abernathy, King valued continuity and he believed the
organization would only stay the course if his right-hand man succeeded him. King told
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Abernathy that “you are the only person who could keep the team together. And if the team
stays together, then the program will come out of the team.” 2
This study begins with Abernathy’s promotion to SCLC president in 1968. The first chapter
examines the first ten months of Abernathy’s presidential tenure with a focus on the Poor
People’s Campaign, the final project King planned before his death. In the wake of the
assassination, Abernathy decided to move forward with the campaign and SCLC launched the
ambitious project in May. The second chapter analyzes SCLC’s decision to assist in the
organizing and execution of the Charleston hospital strike in the spring and early summer of
1969. Abernathy committed the organization to join with the local activists in Charleston after
he received a telegram from Mary Moultrie, the leader of the dozen black female employees who
lost their jobs at the Medical College of South Carolina (MCH) after a failed attempt to
unionize. 3 The third chapter explores Abernathy’s final years as SCLC president and his
subsequent quest for a congressional seat. In early 1977, Abernathy resigned from the
organization he co-founded after a twenty-year tenure as an SCLC officer. When Jimmy Carter
tapped Andrew Young to become America’s first African-American U.N. Ambassador,
Abernathy entered the special election to fill Young’s vacant seat in the U.S. House of
Representatives. 4 The chapter examines the evolution of the civil rights movement, from
nonviolent demonstrations to the splintering of civil rights organizations and the decision made
by many civil rights activists, including Abernathy, to resign their leadership positions with civil
rights groups and pursue political careers.

2

Ralph David Abernathy, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York: HarperPerennial, 1990), 475-478.
Mary Moultrie to Ralph David Abernathy and Andy Young, telegram, March 22, 1969, SCLC Papers, Box 57, Folder
9, Stuart A. Rose Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University.
4
Abernathy, 584-85.
3

2

Martin Luther King Jr. serves as the focus of much of the existing scholarship on the SCLC
and the leadership of the civil rights movement. Historians frequently mention Ralph David
Abernathy and two of the most prominent civil rights scholars, Taylor Branch and David J.
Garrow, interviewed Abernathy for their multi-volume works. Yet Abernathy remains a
secondary figure in many monographs, perhaps due to his unwavering public support of King.
Years after his resignation from SCLC, Abernathy acknowledged that his steadfast loyalty to
King might have led some of his colleagues to overlook his contributions to the organization’s
campaigns, “I’m sure it seemed to them that I was no more than an appendage to Martin,
someone who served as a part companion, part bodyguard, but who never played an important
role in the decisions that affected the direction of the movement.” 5
Both Branch and Garrow conclude their studies of the SCLC and the civil rights movement
with King’s assassination. In addition, Adam Fairclough devoted a chapter of his monograph on
the SCLC to Abernathy’s presidency. Fairclough argues that Abernathy’s decision to remain a
loyal partner to King cost him the opportunity to develop his own leadership style. As a result,
Fairclough believes Abernathy’s efforts “to emulate King’s intellectual style” failed to resonate
with the SCLC staff and caused the organization to founder in the early 1970s. 6
Labor historians Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg have also studied Abernathy, primarily
through a comprehensive analysis of the Charleston hospital workers’ strike. Fink and
Greenberg devoted a chapter to the strike in their 1989 monograph on Local 1199, the national
hospital workers’ union. The authors illuminate the goals of Local 1199, the SCLC, the strike’s
participants, and Charleston’s African American residents concluding that, while a clear victory
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eluded all three groups, each constituency achieved notable gains as a result of the strike. 7 Other
historians, such as, Christopher P. Lehman, described the strike as a victory for the SCLC while
scholar Steve Estes posits that the strike resulted in financial and political empowerment for the
city’s black residents. 8
Gerald D. McKnight’s 1998 book remains the definitive monograph on the Poor People’s
Campaign. McKnight argues that the failure of the campaign does not rest solely with
Abernathy and the SCLC. Although he acknowledges that the SCLC’s leaders botched any
chance at generating goodwill from the media and the American public due to the
mismanagement of their Resurrection City encampment, McKnight contends that the campaign
faced insurmountable obstacles from the beginning. These obstacles included a lack of support
from the Johnson White House, the FBI’s attempts to undermine the campaign through unlawful
surveillance, and miserable weather conditions throughout the length of the encampment. 9
During her term as president of the Organization of American Historians, Jacquelyn D. Hall
implored scholars to produce studies that expand the scope of the civil rights movement. Hall
lamented the emergence of a “master narrative” of the civil rights movement, which “begins with
the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, proceeds through public protests, and
culminates with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”
According to Hall, this dominant narrative presents the civil rights movement as a short,
triumphal event that occurred exclusively in the South and resulted in the desegregation of public
facilities and the extension of voting rights to African Americans. In contrast to this brief and
7
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one-dimensional account, Hall argues that a more accurate framework of the black freedom
struggle should begin in the 1930s and extend beyond the Voting Rights Act and into the final
decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, Hall contends that the “long civil rights movement”
featured additional objectives beyond the acquisition of basic citizenship rights for African
Americans, such as new opportunities for employment and economic advancement for women
and racial minority groups. 10
In the years since Hall presented her argument for a new interpretive framework of the civil
rights movement, numerous scholars produced studies that examine the black freedom struggle
beyond the 1954-1965 timeframe. Erik S. Gellman examined the National Negro Congress, a
militant group of civil rights activists that operated in northern cities during the 1930s. Jason
Morgan Ward analyzed the long massive resistance movement to civil rights carried out by white
segregationists from the 1930s through 1965 and in a separate study, he argues that America’s
“civil rights century” began at the close of World War I when African Americans demanded the
same freedom at home that America promoted abroad during the war. Glenda Gilmore traced
the origins of civil rights activism to the interwar period in the first half of the twentieth
century. 11
In addition to the scholarship on the early decades of the long civil rights movement,
historians began to expand the timeframe of their studies to include the late 1960s, the entire
1970s, and, in some cases, even the 1980s. Joseph Crespino and Kevin M. Kruse produced
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monographs that analyze the rise of conservatism and the New Right as a reaction to federal
court decisions of the 1950s and federal civil rights legislation of the 1960s in Mississippi and
Atlanta, respectively. Other scholars, such as Cynthia Griggs Fleming and Tomiko BrownNagin examined grassroots efforts in the black freedom struggle throughout the 1970s and into
the 1980s in rural Alabama and Atlanta, respectively. Likewise, J. Todd Moye’s study of the
black freedom activists and massive resistance groups in a rural Mississippi county covers a
period of four decades, from 1945-1986. 12
Despite the recent surge of historical scholarship on the decades that preceded and followed
the master narrative period, defined by Hall as 1954-1965, few scholars have examined the
challenges encountered by the leaders of America’s prominent civil rights organizations
following the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The assassination of Martin Luther King
Jr. robbed the SCLC of its president and left the movement without its symbolic leader, an
individual capable of uniting diverse groups, such as middle-class black professionals, white
liberals, and members of other civil rights organizations, under the common cause of equality.
Ralph David Abernathy inherited the burden of succeeding a genuine icon of the movement just
before the launch of SCLC’s most ambitious direct-action campaign since the Selma-toMontgomery Voting Rights March. Moreover, Abernathy’s promotion came at a time when
America’s political landscape began to shift and the election of Richard Nixon signaled a new
era, which resulted in a decline in support for civil rights from the White House. Yet many
historians chose to focus their studies of the later civil rights era on local movements and
12

Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern
Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Cynthia Griggs Fleming, In the Shadow of Selma:
The Continuing Struggle for Civil Rights in the Rural South (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long History of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011); J. Todd Moye, Let The People Decide: Black Freedom and White Resistance Movements in
Sunflower County, Mississippi, 1945-1986 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

6

grassroots organizers instead of analyzing national civil rights leaders such as Abernathy as well
as the leaders of emerging organizations such as Jesse Jackson, who broke away from SCLC to
form People United to Save Humanity (PUSH), and Coretta Scott King, who sought to
commemorate her husband’s legacy by establishing a center in his name.
Two recent studies analyze Abernathy’s stint as SCLC president after King’s death in 1968.
Christopher P. Lehman examines Abernathy within the broader framework of the civil rights
movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, Lehman’s study focuses on the national
civil rights organizations during this period and other leaders such as King, as well as other
groups such as SNCC, receive a significant amount of analysis in addition to Abernathy. More
recently, J. Michael Butler refers to the adversity Abernathy faced as SCLC president during the
early 1970s in a study of the black freedom struggle in Escambia County, Florida. Yet Butler’s
book focuses on the protests and activism of the local affiliates of SCLC and the NAACP and he
limits the discussion of Abernathy to the SCLC president’s specific interactions with H. K.
Matthews, the founder of the organization’s Escambia County chapter. By contrast, my study
situates Abernathy and SCLC at the forefront of the later years of the civil rights movement. 13
The history of SCLC and the post-1968 civil rights movement remains incomplete without a
thorough examination of Ralph David Abernathy’s tenure as the organization’s president.
Previous studies of the organization’s activities either end with King’s death or include a brief
discussion of Abernathy’s stint as a national civil rights leader. This study analyzes Abernathy’s
presidency and his subsequent campaign for a Congressional seat. From the moment he became
SCLC president in the spring of 1968 until the end of his campaign for Congress, Abernathy
sought to advance King’s goal of eliminating poverty in America. As the events in the ensuing
13
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chapters illustrate, numerous obstacles, including some self-inflicted mistakes, prevented
Abernathy from achieving this ambitious goal.

8

CHAPTER ONE:
THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN

In the summer of 1965, after the Watts riots drew national attention to racism and tensions in
Los Angeles, prominent historian C. Vann Woodward analyzed the results of the civil rights
movement in an essay published in The New York Times Magazine. Woodward lauded the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965:
The result is one of the most impressive achievements in Congressional history.
Within the past year, under Administration pressure, Congress has put more teeth
in the law and more law on the books than it has in the whole period since 1875.
It was as if the first Reconstruction had been endowed with the 14th and 15th
Amendments, the Reconstruction Acts, the Freedmen’s Bureau, the Civil Rights
Acts and the Ku Klux Klan Act by one session of Congress. 14
Yet the majority of Woodward’s essay featured his thoughts on the future of the civil rights
movement after the passage of new federal laws that effectively ended racial discrimination in
public accommodations and provided voting rights to African Americans. After describing the
various factions within the civil rights community, Woodward foresaw a shift in the objectives
and strategies of the movement’s activists during the second half of the 1960s and the dawn of
the 1970s. According to Woodward, “In the years ahead, several changes in the movement seem
probable. Protest will continue, perhaps intensify, but unless the movement disintegrates in
explosions of big-city slum insurrection, the trend will be, as Rustin suggests, from protest to

14
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politics. As civil rights diminish in importance, the shift from status politics to economic politics
will increase.” 15
Martin Luther King Jr., president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),
shared his vision for a major protest designed to enhance the economic position of poor people.
In the midst of participating in the Meredith Freedom March in June 1966, King and SCLC
executive vice-president Ralph David Abernathy visited an elementary school in Marks,
Mississippi. The meager food provisions each student received at lunch stunned the two civil
rights activists. Abernathy and King witnessed each student receive a few crackers and a quarter
slice of an apple for lunch. According to Abernathy, the scene left an indelible impression with
King and served as the inspiration for the Poor People’s Campaign, which the SCLC launched
two years later. King believed the campaign would shine a spotlight on the conditions of abject
poverty that many Americans encountered on a daily basis, “We can’t let that kind of poverty
exist in this country. I don’t think people really know that little school children are slowly
starving in the United States of America. I didn’t know it.” 16
By the fall of 1967, King began to plan the Poor People’s Campaign. Alarmed by both the
shifting trend within the black freedom struggle as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC), younger African Americans embracing black power, and race riots in
Detroit and Newark, King decided SCLC needed to initiate a direct-action campaign. After
settling on setting up a mass encampment of poor people in Washington, D.C., King began to
organize what he viewed as perhaps the last best hope to spur the government into enacting
meaningful legislation to improve economic conditions for the nation’s poor. In late January

15
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1968, Jean M. White described King’s mindset in the months preceding the Poor People’s
Campaign in the Washington Post. “As King sees it, a new kind of Selma or Birmingham is
needed to dramatize the economic plight of the Negro and compel the Government to act. He
also personally needs something dramatic to shore up his leadership among the Negroes if he is
to be heard above shouts of black power.” 17
Although King and his SCLC aides targeted impoverished African Americans as primary
participants in the campaign, they intended to present a diverse and eclectic mosaic of America’s
poor citizens. According to Andrew Young, one of King’s top advisors, the Poor People’s
Campaign would include poor citizens from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds, although
African Americans would comprise the bulk of the campaign’s 3,000 protesters. King’s goals
for the campaign consisted of an ambitious set of economic initiatives that he hoped Congress
would pass in response to the persistent pressure applied by 3,000 protesters living in a
shantytown in the shadow of the Capitol. White suggested King’s initial requests of Congress
would likely include “a guaranteed income, a $20 billion-a-year program to help the poor, (and)
a $1000-per-pupil expenditure in ghetto schools.” 18
By February 1968, King and his aides drafted a list of demands for Congress, which they
deemed necessary to alleviate economic inequality in America. Framing these requests as an
“economic and social Bill of Rights,” King’s list included “Passage of an Emergency
Employment Act of the type approved by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in
1967.” King specified that an employment act needed to create at least 250,000 jobs in the
public sector, including positions within the fields of “health, public safety, education,
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recreation” along with a host of other departments at the municipal, state, and federal levels of
government. Other provisions within the proposed Bill of Rights included the addition of the
Sub-Employment Index to the Department of Labor’s monthly employment statistics, and a
nationwide expansion of Turnkey III, a federal housing project that provided 200 homes for
impoverished families near Gulfport, Mississippi. Another request demanded a fund “for an
immediate beginning of work on a racially and socially integrated model city for 250,000
citizens and a commitment to build such a city, with requisite federal subsidies, as quickly as
possible.” 19
King delegated the planning duties for the Poor People’s Campaign to Bernard Lafayette Jr.,
a former SNCC field secretary who joined SCLC as the organization’s program director in the
fall of 1967. Lafayette’s organizational skills paid immediate dividends during the initial
planning phase of the campaign in the early months of 1968. Lafayette persuaded Anthony
Henry and William Moyer, two community organizers from the American Friends Service
Committee, to lay the foundation of the campaign from the SCLC’s Washington office. As a
result, numerous Washington groups publicly supported the campaign, including the Council of
Churches of Greater Washington, the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, the
Washington Teachers Union, and the National Association of Social Workers. 20
Unbeknownst to King, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover directed his agents to work on
undermining the campaign before SCLC and its recruits could arrive in Washington in late April.
Officially known as POCAM, the bureau’s crusade against the Poor People’s Campaign involved
19
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local field agents discrediting King’s planned demonstration through false rumors of a lack of
SCLC funding and a threat of the cancellation of federal welfare checks for any individuals who
joined the campaign as participants. Local field offices instructed informants to spread these
rumors and warnings throughout the neighborhoods and communities where low-income African
American families resided. James A. Harrison, SCLC’s comptroller, provided the FBI with
extensive knowledge of the organization’s plans as a paid informant. 21
In addition to the FBI’s covert efforts to sabotage the campaign, King and SCLC encountered
another unforeseen challenge to the Washington demonstration. In February, racial tensions
reached a crescendo in Memphis when more than half of the city’s predominantly black
sanitation workers went on strike. The striking workers demanded better working conditions and
the right to unionize. On March 18, just over a month after the strike commenced, King traveled
to the city to address the striking workers and their supporters at Mason Temple. King’s speech
echoed the sentiments of Rev. James M. Lawson Jr., a Memphis-based minister and SNCC
veteran, who described the strike to The New York Times as “a significant turn in the civil rights
movement and a new chapter in labor history. Never before has a union been backed by a whole
community like this.” 22
Ten days after his address at Mason Temple, King returned to Memphis to lead a march of
demonstrators through the city’s downtown streets. King’s best intentions of leading a
nonviolent march of peaceful protesters fell by the wayside when African American youths
began to destroy storefront windows and loot local businesses. Memphis police responded by
using tear gas, mace, and batons on the rioters. When violence enveloped the march, King and
21
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his aides quickly departed the scene in a vehicle that delivered them to a local motel. Amidst the
chaos, Memphis police officer Leslie Dean Jones shot and killed Larry Payne, a 16-year-old
African American. Jones contended that he spotted Payne carrying a television near a local
department store targeted by looters and pursued the youth into the basement of an apartment.
The officer claimed Payne charged at him with butcher knife, which caused him to open fire,
killing Payne. 23
As he watched reports of the riot on television in his hotel suite that evening, King worried
that he would take the blame for the violent outcome of the march. Unlike some of the prior
protests he conducted in Birmingham and Selma, King and his aides did not train the striking
Memphis sanitation workers in nonviolent tactics prior to the march. Moreover, King arrived in
Memphis an hour after the march’s scheduled 10 a.m. start and he joined the in-progress protest.
Though it remains unclear whether the rioting African American youths participated in the
march from its outset or used the protest as an opportunity to shield authorities from their
vandalism, King voiced his displeasure at the unfortunate turn of events to Ralph Abernathy and
Bernard Lee. According to Abernathy, a frustrated King proclaimed, “Maybe we’ll just have to
let violence run its course. Maybe people will listen to the voice of violence. They certainly
won’t listen to us.” 24
One day after the Memphis riots King affirmed his commitment to nonviolence. He declared
that the upcoming Poor People’s Campaign, slated to begin in Washington three weeks later,
would take place without the violence that derailed the Memphis march. In a press conference,
King admitted that the outbreak of violence caught him off-guard. The SCLC president insisted
23
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that, “If I had known there was a possibility of violence yesterday I would not have had that
particular march.” Determined to demonstrate that peaceful protests could take place in
Memphis, King vowed to return to the city “as quickly as possible” to lead another march. King
added that the encampment planned for the nation’s capital would feature nonviolent protests.
Yet he did not issue an assurance that the campaign would take place free of any disturbances.
Instead, King explained that “Riots are part of the ugly atmosphere of our society. I cannot
guarantee that riots will not take place this summer. I can only guarantee that our
demonstrations will not be violent.” 25
In contrast to King’s determination to hold nonviolent protests in Memphis and Washington,
several politicians expressed their belief that the Memphis riots served as a harbinger to a
volatile and unpredictable mass protest in the nation’s capital. Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV)
called for the government to seek a court order to prevent King and the SCLC from staging any
kind of demonstration. Addressing his concerns about King’s planned campaign a day after the
Memphis riots, Byrd remarked, “If this self-seeking rabble-rouser is allowed to go through with
his plans here, Washington may well be treated to the same kind of violence, destruction,
looting, and bloodshed.” Another conservative Democrat, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi,
suggested that King’s protest consist of a small group of individuals who “symbolically” travel
to Capitol Hill in order to address their concerns with the plight of the nation’s poor. Stennis
thought the government should block any larger constituency of protesters from entering the city.
In addition to Byrd and Stennis, Senator Edward Brooke, a Massachusetts Republican and the
only African American member of Congress’s upper chamber, also doubted that King and his
aides could effectively control protesters. Brooke wondered, “How do you avoid assembling
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that many people under the inflammable conditions that exist today where one little spark—some
irresponsible kid—could set it off? How do you keep looters out?” 26
Another Memphis march presented King with an opportunity to demonstrate that the
nonviolent tactics he employed for years could still unite the black community and force
lawmakers into improving the lives of African American citizens by passing meaningful
legislation. Six weeks before the march, Robert C. Maynard addressed the challenges facing
King and SCLC in the Washington Post. In an article published under the headline “Is King’s
Nonviolence Now Old-Fashioned?” Maynard, a black correspondent, expressed concern over
King’s place among black civil rights leaders if the Poor People’s Campaign failed. Maynard
posed questions that suggested a harsh reality for King and SCLC if the campaign did not
resonate with the American public, “If that happens, what becomes of Martin Luther King? What
becomes of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference? Most important, what becomes of
the nonviolence that Dr. King, almost alone of the great civil rights leaders of the 1960s, still
espouses?” Since the violence that accompanied the Memphis march occurred just six weeks
after reporters like Maynard questioned the relevance of King’s nonviolent methods, the SCLC
president needed to return to Memphis in order to demonstrate that his organization’s approach
remained effective and would work in Washington. 27
Yet King understood that the “economic politics” Woodward identified as the new focus of
the civil rights movement nearly three years earlier remained the most important objective of his
organization, even above a massive nonviolent demonstration in Washington. In a sermon in the
city’s National Cathedral on March 31, King acknowledged the possibility of eschewing the Poor
26
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People’s Campaign if President Johnson and the U.S. Congress took significant steps toward
improving the bleak economic conditions that existed in urban communities across the country.
In a news conference following the service, King told the press that, “I would be glad to talk to
President Johnson or anyone else. But I wouldn’t say that a mere statement that something will
be done—just a pat on the back—would cause us to call off the march.” 28
Instead, King wanted specific details on potential federal aid packages, including dates and
procedures for disbursement to potential recipients. According to King, “It would have to be
something much more specific—would have to be a commitment with a positive timetable for
this summer—for us to call off the march. And I don’t see that forthcoming.” The SCLC
president even suggested that he would move the campaign to the respective political
conventions if Johnson and other elected officials ignored the Washington demonstration. King
issued a warning to both political parties. “They will have a real awakening in Chicago,” he told
Ben A. Franklin from The New York Times. “That does not mean that the Republicans can feel
that they will not experience the same thing at their convention in Miami.” 29
When King returned to Memphis on April 3, he learned that U.S. District Court Judge Bailey
Brown granted a temporary restraining order at the request of Fred Gianotti, Memphis’s city
attorney. Memphis mayor Henry Loeb instructed Gianotti to seek the restraining order, which
barred King from holding any protest march in the city. In the wake of the turmoil that occurred
during King’s march the previous week, Gianotti argued that another protest march might result
in “great damage” in Memphis, where racial tensions remained high in the midst of the sanitation
workers’ strike. Frustrated with a court order that he viewed as “illegal and unconstitutional,”
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King sought to get the ruling overturned as quickly as possible. If his legal team failed to win a
reversal of the restraining order, King vowed to violate the ruling. In his comments to the press,
King framed the conflict in moral terms, “It will be on the basis of my conscience saying that we
have a moral right and responsibility to march.” 30
The restraining order postponed King’s march, originally scheduled for Friday April 5, at
least until the following Monday. In the meantime, while his lawyers prepared to challenge the
restraining order, King returned to the Mason Temple and delivered a stirring public speech.
According to Abernathy, King initially decided to skip the appearance due to the strong
possibility of a low turnout since afternoon thunderstorms persisted in Memphis throughout the
evening hours. Accompanied by Jesse Jackson, Abernathy arrived at the church and saw a
crowd of “about five hundred people” and a phalanx of local television cameras. Abernathy
called King and persuaded the SCLC president to come to the church and address the
surprisingly sizable audience. Following an introduction by Abernathy, King stressed the need
to continue using nonviolent procedures in direct-action protests, including marches and
economic boycotts. King concluded the speech with an eerie prediction of his own death, “Like
anybody, I would like to live a long life. Longevity has its place. But I’m not concerned about
that now. I just want to do God’s will. And He’s allowed me to go up to the mountain, and I’ve
looked over, and I’ve seen the promised land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to
know tonight that we as a people will get to the promised land.” 31
King died the next day, shot by James Earl Ray as King stood on the balcony of his suite at
the Lorraine Motel. Two days later, with King’s body housed at a local funeral home, Ralph
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David Abernathy succeeded Martin Luther King Jr. as president of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, the civil rights organization the two men helped establish a decade
earlier. 32
Three years before King’s assassination in Memphis, SCLC revised its bylaws to account for
a presidential succession plan in the event that King died while serving as the organization’s
president. At King’s request, the organization officially designated Ralph David Abernathy as
his successor immediately following his death. Although Abernathy and King remained
virtually inseparable throughout their thirteen-year partnership, several SCLC leaders, including
King’s father, who served on the organization’s board, privately disagreed with the decision.
They viewed the decision as King’s concession to his friend for years of loyal service and a
means to placate Abernathy. Some of the organization’s staff members believed that he
remained jealous that King, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, did not insist that
Abernathy also receive recognition as a co-recipient of the award. 33
As a result of King’s death, Abernathy became the president of SCLC, the most prominent
civil rights organization in America in 1968. Many Americans, in both the African American
and white communities, knew nothing about Ralph David Abernathy. On April 6, The New York
Times described Abernathy as “calm, slow-talking and very polite,” while King “was the
leader—eloquent and beloved by the crowds.” The profile included basic biographic details on
Abernathy and his family along with the origin story of his friendship with King, a relationship
that began in the midst of the Montgomery Bus Boycott. The newspaper noted the close
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relationship between Abernathy and King, including the fact that many of his associates viewed
Abernathy as “Dr. King’s alter ego.” 34
Two days later, the Chicago Defender, one of the nation’s most influential African American
newspapers, published a similar profile of Abernathy. The newspaper informed its readers that
Abernathy “marched at King’s side, made tours for him and spoke in his absence when King’s
crushing schedule forced him to cancel a speech, but Abernathy’s style kept him in the
background.” According to the article, Abernathy “is a gifted speaker, but lacks the oratorical
talents King had and the charisma King possessed.” After predicting that Abernathy would
likely lean on SCLC’s top officials through the duration of the Poor People’s Campaign, the
newspaper concluded that, “He is unlikely to emerge as another Martin Luther King.” 35
Born on March 11, 1926, Abernathy spent his childhood on a farm near tiny Linden,
Alabama, a rural community in the state’s west central region. At the time of Abernathy’s birth,
Linden’s population stood at 700 residents. (According to a 2015 estimate, the current
population of Abernathy’s hometown sits at 2,025 residents). 36 The tenth of twelve children,
Abernathy toiled alongside family members on his father’s farm, a five-hundred acre spread that
the elder Abernathy acquired in incremental tracts over many years. Abernathy realized at a
young age that he wanted to pursue a career as a clergyman. At the age of seven, Abernathy
spent a week attending a revival held at the local Baptist church. Spellbound by the oratory of a
Birmingham preacher, Abernathy took the first step toward his future profession by following his
mother’s suggestion to pray and fast “until God speaks to you and tells you that you belong to
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Him.” Several hours after listening to his mother’s instructions, the young Abernathy
experienced a spiritual awakening and established a lifelong connection with God. According to
Abernathy, “My sins had been forgiven. I had been reborn.” 37
Following a stint in the U.S. Army during the final years of World War II, Abernathy
returned to Alabama. Using the money he received from the G.I. Bill, Abernathy enrolled at
Alabama State College, a historically black, four-year school located in the state’s capital city of
Montgomery. During his college years, Abernathy participated in his first protests. As president
of the college’s student council, Abernathy organized a campus-wide hunger strike to protest the
striking disparity in food quality between the students’ meals and the entrées reserved for the
college’s faculty. While faculty members ate “huge hunks of real ham” for dinner, the dining
staff only provided “Spam and unbuttered grits” for students. Midway through the second day of
the strike, following four meals which the students skipped, the college’s president, H.C.
Trenholm, summoned Abernathy to his office for a meeting. Trenholm assured Abernathy that
the quality of meals would improve as soon as the students returned to the dining hall. When the
students arrived at the dining hall for dinner that evening, plates of fried chicken awaited them.
For Abernathy, the strike provided an unforgettable lesson on confrontations with authority
figures, “You can deal with the most awesome authority on an equal basis if the people are on
your side.” 38
One year after the hunger strike, Abernathy organized another campus protest. In order to
meet the housing needs of a male student body that continued to increase with the addition of
former servicemen, the college acquired military barracks from nearby Maxwell Air Force Base.
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The male students viewed the older barracks as substandard living facilities due to faulty
showers, dilapidated toilets, and an unreliable heating system during the winter months. After
listening to the complaints of his fellow residents, Abernathy organized another campus protest.
He also scheduled a meeting with Trenholm and Levi Watkins, the man who oversaw the
acquisition and upkeep of the on-campus barracks. Accompanied by a group of his peers,
Abernathy expressed his concerns with the unsuitable living conditions to Trenholm, who asked
Watkins about the validity of the students’ depiction of the residential facilities. When Watkins
verified the inadequate conditions within the antiquated barracks, Trenholm announced a plan to
enhance the college’s male residential facilities. Abernathy cited his two meetings with
Trenholm as pivotal moments for the challenges he led as a civil rights leader in the decades that
followed his college years. According to Abernathy,
The victories I won were relatively small, but their importance to my own selfconfidence cannot be overestimated. I believe that my later dealings with mayors,
governors, and presidents were significantly facilitated by these two meetings in
Dr. Trenholm’s office. As a matter of fact, no man ever intimidated me in the
same way that Dr. Trenholm did; and when I met Presidents Johnson, Nixon,
Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush they somehow seemed lesser men than this stern
black scholar, with his regal bearing and his steady, dispassionate gaze. 39

After graduating from Alabama State in 1950, Abernathy resisted the urge to pursue a
full-time career as pastor. Instead, he moved to Atlanta and enrolled in graduate school at
Atlanta University. During his years in graduate school, Abernathy encountered Martin Luther
King Jr. for the first time. Following his first year in graduate school at Crozer Theological
Seminary in Pennsylvania, King returned to Atlanta and served as a guest preacher at Ebenezer
Baptist Church, where his father presided as pastor. One Sunday, Abernathy decided to attend a
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service at the church in order to observe the young preacher that a fellow classmate told him
about. Abernathy recognized the preternatural oratorical skills possessed by King, “Already he
was a scholar; and while he didn’t holler as loud as some of the more famous preachers I had
heard, he could holler loud enough when he wanted to. Even then I could tell that he was a man
with a special gift from God.” As he exited the church, Abernathy greeted King in the receiving
line, introduced himself, and commended the guest preacher on his sermon. 40
Several days later, the two men met again at a choir recital on the campus of Spelman
College. Unbeknownst to King, Abernathy recognized his date, who previously feigned an
illness to get out of attending the event with him. A few years later, Abernathy recounted the
story to King who had traveled to Montgomery to audition for the open pastorate at Dexter
Avenue Baptist Church. With both men happily married to other women by then, they shared a
hearty laugh. 41
By 1954, both King and Abernathy held pastorates at prominent churches in Montgomery.
At the age of twenty-six, Abernathy accepted the pulpit at First Baptist Church in the summer of
1952. The 25-year-old King succeeded Vernon Johns as the pastor at Dexter Avenue Baptist
Church in the fall of 1954. On December 1, 1955, just over a year after King arrived in
Montgomery, Rosa Parks, a seamstress and secretary of the city’s NAACP chapter, refused to
give up her seat to a white passenger on a city bus. Following her arrest, Parks told E.D. Nixon,
a prominent black union leader in Montgomery, and Clifford Durr, a white lawyer, that she
would challenge the arrest in an effort to strike down the city’s segregation law. Within a week,
a group of the city’s African American leaders, including Nixon, Abernathy, and King organized
40
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a boycott of the city’s bus system. On December 5, the group held a meeting to create an
organization to coordinate the bus boycott. The group chose King to lead the new Montgomery
Improvement Association and Abernathy agreed to serve as the organization’s program
chairman. 42
Neither King nor Abernathy anticipated that the boycott would last for 381 days or that it
would change the course of their professional careers. At the time, both men sought to establish
their careers as Baptist pastors and while they recognized the need to serve as leaders of
Montgomery’s black community, neither man realized the effect of the boycott on their own
lives. Three decades after the boycott occurred, Abernathy reflected on the conflict it presented
to the two young preachers, “Neither one of us believed he was ready to lead a national crusade.
Martin wanted a few more years of experience in the pulpit. I wanted a Ph.D. Both of us
believed that because we were still in our twenties, we did not have the maturity necessary to
confront the formidable white leadership arrayed against us in every state capitol and county
courthouse in the South.” 43
Yet the success of the boycott, which ended December 20, 1956 when the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the ruling of a federal court ruling that declared the city’s segregated bus
ordinances unconstitutional, catapulted King into the national spotlight as an effective civil rights
activist. Within two months of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Browder v. Gayle, King and
Abernathy, along with several other leading African American preachers, including C.K. Steele
of Tallahassee, Theodore J. Jemison of Baton Rouge, and A.L. Davis of New Orleans, created
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. On the heels of his successful stint leading the
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Montgomery Improvement Association, King agreed to serve as the organization’s first
president. The group chose Abernathy as the organization’s treasurer. 44
Together, the two men collaborated on a relentless campaign to end segregation in the South
and enhance economic opportunities for poor African Americans throughout the nation. Their
activism spanned thirteen years, countless jail cells, and included landmark victories in
Birmingham and Selma as well as frustrating defeats in Albany and Chicago. King’s death in
Memphis thrust Abernathy into the spotlight to carry on the grand plans of his closest friend’s
final attempt to improve the lives of America’s poor citizens.
Two weeks after King’s death, Abernathy announced that SCLC planned to launch the Poor
People’s Campaign on April 29. Addressing the media at a news conference in Atlanta,
Abernathy described the organization’s intent to stage “the most militant and aggressive
nonviolent war ever waged by the human and civil rights movement in this country.” Abernathy
outlined the SCLC’s objective to “lead waves of American poor people to Washington,” and he
vowed that “we will stay there, engaging in militant nonviolent action, until the Congress deals
with the issue of poverty and racism in the United States.” According to Abernathy, the
campaign would unfold in two stages. The campaign would kick off with a delegation of 100
individuals traveling to Washington on April 29 in order to meet with politicians and government
officials. Slated to begin on May 2, the second stage would begin with a ceremony honoring
King’s memory at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis and continue with a march to the nation’s
capital. 45

44
45

Garrow, 89-90.
Earl Caldwell, “Abernathy Pledges ‘Militant’ Drive for the Poor,” The New York Times, April 19, 1968, 21.

25

In addition to honoring King’s memory, the decision to proceed with the Poor People’s
Campaign provided the SCLC with an opportunity to raise money and awareness regarding
poverty in America. King’s death generated a wave of donations to SCLC and the organization’s
leaders believed the campaign would inspire more donors to pledge gifts to fund their work.
According to Hosea Williams, one of the campaign’s regional coordinators, the assassination of
King caused donors who previously rebuffed the organization’s request for financial support to
reconsider: “Elements that were dead set against us are now prone to be more cooperative. We
find ourselves in a new position, and we hope we can make the best of it.” As a result, the
Memphis march served as a prelude to the Poor People’s Campaign, a much larger
demonstration with more ambitious goals than the resolution of a municipal sanitation workers’
strike. On April 27, two days before the scheduled launch of the campaign, the Chicago
Defender outlined the stakes of the campaign for its readers, “Thus, the nation is in for a
considerable period of protest this spring—which is likely either to spur anti-poverty measures or
end in rioting, as one of the Memphis demonstrations did. What would come of the protests
depends largely on what control is maintained by SCLC over them.” 46
As Abernathy and his SCLC colleagues prepared for an indefinite encampment in
Washington, opponents of the campaign spoke out against the pending demonstration. Senator
Russell Long (D-LA) vowed that he would demand the censure or expulsion of any member of
Congress who supported “bending the knee” to accommodate the requests of the campaign’s
leaders. Long suggested a relocation of the capital if local and federal authorities permitted the
demonstrations to occur in Washington: “When that bunch of marchers comes here, they can just
burn the whole place down and we can just move the capital to some place where they enforce
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the law.” In addition to Long, Dr. Thomas W. Matthew, a prominent black businessman,
announced his opposition to the guaranteed income provisions sought by the campaign’s leaders.
According to Matthew, “Our grandparents had a guaranteed annual income. They called it
slavery. We should know better.” As an alternative, Matthew proposed a ten-year self-help
economic development program that would consist of a combination of public and private loans,
including $100 million in annual federal loans at two percent interest, 20-year private loans at
four percent interest, and loans from foreign investors at six percent interest over five years. 47
On April 29, Abernathy led a group of approximately 150 individuals into Washington to
launch the Poor People’s Campaign. Abernathy engaged in a series of discussions with a range
of Cabinet officials from the Johnson White House, including Secretary of Agriculture Orville L.
Freeman, Attorney General Ramsay Clark, and Labor Secretary W. Willard Wertz. During the
meetings, Abernathy expressed a set of SCLC’s concerns regarding the obstacles faced by the
nation’s poor. Abernathy issued the following request to Wertz, “We ask you to eliminate
programs that try to fit poor people to a system that has systematically excluded them from
sharing in America’s plenty. We say that the system must change and adjust to the needs of
millions who are unemployed or under-employed.” The group presented a statement in their
meeting with Clark that outlined their frustration with the relationship between the poor and law
enforcement agencies claiming, “Justice is not a reality for the black, Mexican-American, Indian
and Puerto Rican poor.” The statement cited an increasing wave of discrimination in multiple
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areas, including housing, education, and employment, as contributing factors to the distrust
between poor citizens and law enforcement officials. 48
Abernathy and his delegation of his supporters came away from their meetings encouraged
with the Johnson Administration’s willingness to listen to their grievances about the nation’s
failure to provide adequate opportunities for its poor citizens to escape poverty. Yet the group
remained firm in their demands, particularly their primary stipulation of jobs for every ablebodied citizen and a guaranteed income for individuals who lacked the minimum capabilities for
employment. Abernathy assured reporters that “we’ll be back in 10 days for some answers,”
from federal government officials. 49
Returning to the scene of King’s death, Abernathy officially launched the Poor People’s
Campaign on May 2 with a ceremony in Memphis at the balcony of the Lorraine Motel suite
where King died nearly a month earlier. The SCLC president marked the transition between the
mourning of King’s death and the beginning of the campaign that had consumed the final months
of his life, “The moment has come. The days of weeping are ended. The days of march have
begun.” Following the ceremony, eight busloads of African American supporters traveled from
Memphis to Marks, Mississippi, the site of King’s confrontation with the abject poverty that
black schoolchildren encountered on a daily basis at lunchtime two years earlier. Noting the
numerous logistical changes involving lodging—SCLC officials split the delegation of marchers
into separate groups with “about 300” spending the night in Marks and the remainder returning
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to Memphis—the Associated Press characterized the campaign’s launch as a “confused opening
day.” 50
Shortly after Abernathy and the campaign’s participants began their caravan to Washington
from Memphis and the Mississippi Delta, Lyndon Johnson spoke publicly about the massive
demonstration that would eventually occur in the nation’s capital. One day after the campaign
launched, Johnson expressed his hope that the protesters allow Congress and the federal
government the opportunity to address any grievances they brought forth upon their arrival in the
nation’s capital. Since Abernathy echoed King’s promise of remaining encamped with
supporters in Washington for the duration of the summer if necessary, Johnson urged that the
demonstrators should step back and let the government work instead of engaging in an indefinite
demonstration. In Johnson’s view, “We do expect that the poor will be better served if, after that
viewpoint is presented, that the Congress and the appropriate administrative agencies can have
the time to try to act upon it and execute it.” 51
Despite the logistical missteps that hampered the campaign’s first day, the caravan began to
gain momentum by the end of its opening week. On May 6, a group of “nearly one thousand
Negroes” marched through Selma, Alabama, site of a brutal attack on civil rights demonstrators
during a 1965 march in support of the Voting Rights Act. Abernathy led the marchers through
downtown Selma where demonstrators paused to remember fallen civil rights activists by placing
memorial wreaths around the city. 52 Following an overnight stay, Abernathy led the caravan of
300 demonstrators from Selma to Montgomery. As the group reached the outskirts of Alabama’s
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capitol city, a large contingent of supporters joined for the march through Montgomery’s
downtown streets. According to an account of the Selma-to-Montgomery leg of the caravan in
The New York Times, a crowd of “some 2,000 persons were walking along behind Mr.
Abernathy” by the time the march ended in the city’s “predominantly Negro west side.” 53
Three days after the Montgomery portion of the caravan, the SCLC received a permit from
the National Park Service to build a temporary encampment in Washington D.C., in a section of
West Potomac Park, located near the Lincoln Memorial. With Abernathy still leading the
caravan in the Deep South, Lafayette, the SCLC program director, addressed the news media at a
press conference on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. The permit allowed a group of 3,000
activists to reside in the encampment from May 11 until 8 p.m. on June 16. In addition, the
permit could be renewed if necessary. At the press conference, Lafayette declared that “We are
here to stay and to conduct our campaign until our demands are met.” 54
When the caravan reached Atlanta, King’s hometown and the headquarters of the SCLC,
Abernathy delivered a passionate speech at the Butler Street YMCA’s Hunger Club tribute to
King on May 8. In a nearly hour-long address, Abernathy promised to continue King’s mission
of eliminating poverty in America. Vowing to serve “as the same kind of troublemaker as
Martin Luther King,” Abernathy declared that, “If we can spend billions to send a man to the
moon, we can spend billions to stand a man on his feet.” The SCLC president added that poor
people “aren’t begging for charity, we are demanding civilized justice. We are not asking for
favors, we are talking about equality.” Like his predecessor, Abernathy realized the stakes
involved with the Poor People’s Campaign. He told the nearly 400 attendees that the campaign
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might represent the “last attempt anybody is going to make to deal with these problems
peacefully.” 55
Abernathy’s remarks resonated with the interracial crowd at the Hunger Club tribute.
Audience applause interrupted Abernathy sixteen times during his speech. 56 Despite a few
logistical glitches, the early weeks of the Poor People’s Campaign, beginning with the launch of
the caravan in Marks, resulted in favorable media coverage for Abernathy and the SCLC. As
Gerald McKnight notes, “The national press, including some large southern dailies, the three
major television networks, and Britain’s BBC, recognized good copy when they saw it, giving
the mule train broad and sustained coverage.” Abernathy and Hosea Williams rode in the lead
wagon, driven by mules who received the derisive monikers “Stennis” and “Eastland,” after
Mississippi’s two segregationist senators. In front of crowds of supporters and members of the
news media, the two SCLC leaders often joked about the origin of the mules’ monikers. 57
Within a week of his address at the Butler Street YMCA, Abernathy arrived in Washington
to open Resurrection City, the encampment where campaign demonstrators would reside during
the campaign. On May 13, Abernathy “drove a ceremonial nail” into the stake of the first of
hundreds of plywood shelters erected to house campaign participants. The SCLC president
informed reporters that the campaign would last “until the Congress of the United States decide
that they are going to do something about the plight of the poor people by doing away with
poverty, unemployment and underemployment in this country.” Before hammering away at the
ceremonial nail, Abernathy asked a young Native American woman from the Creek Nation of
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Oklahoma for permission to “use this land.” After she granted “permission,” Abernathy
christened the encampment “Resurrection City, U.S.A.” 58
With the launch of the Poor People’s Campaign and the construction of Resurrection City
complete, the focus of the campaign shifted toward meetings with government officials, life in
the encampment, and Abernathy’s performance in his first significant leadership opportunity as
SCLC president. Two days after the opening of Resurrection City, Abernathy met with a large
delegation of Congress—seven senators and 65 representatives—on Capitol Hill to discuss the
goals of the campaign. He reassured the elected officials that the campaign’s demonstrations
would remain peaceful and “disruptions of the government” would only occur “as a last resort”
in the event that negotiations failed.
While Abernathy met with congressional leaders to promote the campaign, he remained the
focus of reporters who speculated about how he would lead this large-scale project designed by
his predecessor. Thrust into the most prominent leadership position among the nation’s civil
rights organizations just five weeks before the opening of Resurrection City, Abernathy went
from serving as a loyal acolyte at King’s side to the face of SCLC just as the organization
launched its most ambitious direct-action campaign since Selma. With thousands of
demonstrators descending on Washington to participate in the campaign, reporters and
politicians wondered how Abernathy would fare as the leader of an ambitious campaign devised
by his iconic predecessor. On May 18, the Chicago Defender published a UPI story in which
three of the wire service’s reporters “pool their impressions in the following team report on the
little-known but suddenly powerful man who emerged from obscurity to succeed Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.” The article provided readers with basic biographical details about Abernathy
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and his relationship with King. According to one civil rights activist “who worked closely” with
both men, “Without Ralph Abernathy, Martin Luther King would have been something entirely
different than he was. Ralph was a doer, the glue that held SCLC together. When Martin got
discouraged it was Ralph who kept him going.” 59
Henry P. Leifermann, a UPI reporter who covered both King and Abernathy, acknowledged
that SCLC would likely remain committed to nonviolent demonstrations with Abernathy as
president of the organization. Yet Leifermann also posited that the organization would become
“much more black-oriented” and “dominated by the style of the rural Southern Baptist preacher”
embodied by Abernathy. With the public demonstration phase of the Poor People’s Campaign
set to begin the following week, Louis Cassels alluded to the possibility of a showdown between
Abernathy and Lyndon Johnson if the campaign persisted beyond the end of May. As Cassels
noted, “At this point, no one—including Ralph Abernathy and Lyndon Johnson—can be sure
what’s ahead.” Cassels included a quote from Abernathy to illustrate the SCLC’s commitment
to continue the campaign until Congress met the organization’s demands, “Congress has never
done anything for Negroes or poor people except in response to pressure. We cannot afford to
relent for America’s sake as well as our own. If this non-violent campaign fails, it will bring out
the more militant groups who are just waiting for us to fail. They’re the ones who want to burn
down the country.” 60
Although the Poor People’s Campaign began with great fanfare in late May 1968, problems
surfaced almost as soon as the protest portion of the campaign began. On May 20, Abernathy
announced the possibility of a postponement of Solidarity Day, the showcase event of the
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campaign, from May 30 to a later date to provide additional time for organizers. In addition to a
potential rescheduling of the campaign’s biggest event, tension between Resurrection City
residents and the press began to surface during the campaign’s opening week. Several of the
city’s marshals attempted to bar members of the news media from entering the encampment.
One marshal threatened a group of cameramen to leave unless they wanted to register to
participate as city residents. If the cameramen failed to heed his warning, the marshal vowed to
“cut one of you” with a razorblade. 61
Although an SCLC staffer quickly overruled the marshals and allowed journalists to enter the
city, the incident represented an early example of the struggle between SCLC organizers and
Resurrection City marshals, some of whom engaged in acts of violence against city residents
during their daily patrols of the encampment. Years later, Abernathy characterized the unruly
marshals as “an angry gang” of young black men from Chicago and Detroit who abused their
position within the encampment. Abernathy explained that, “To cope with them, we tried to use
psychology and made a few of the leaders ‘marshals,’ though the only people who really needed
disciplining were their own ranks. But the stratagem didn’t work. They continued to cause
trouble, particularly at night when others were settling down and attempting to go to sleep. So
we had to ship them back home. Unfortunately, we did not locate them all and they made
trouble until the day we left.” 62
The marshals’ harassment of reporters on the city’s opening day stunned many journalists
who received favorable treatment from the SCLC during previous direct-action demonstrations.
As Gerald McKnight notes, the marshals’ hostile behavior toward reporters put an unnecessary
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strain on the relationship between the SCLC and a potentially powerful ally, “Most of the
reporters assigned to the campaign were sympathetic to its goals and were shocked and mystified
by strong-arm tactics that interfered with their efforts to get the story and meet their deadlines.” 63
In addition to the marshals’ volatile behavior toward the press and other Resurrection City
residents, an unforeseen problem arose within the encampment in the form of inclement weather.
Torrential downpours doused the encampment throughout the first full week, which resulted in
muddy conditions resembling a swamp rather than a makeshift residential city. Heavy rain on
May 23 and consistent precipitation the next day forced a temporary evacuation of “about 100 to
150” residents due to the resulting damages to their plywood homes. On a mission to determine
“the feasibility of donating heating units to cook food in the city’s kitchen,” Pat Brown, a former
California governor, viewed the mud-covered community and recommended a full evacuation of
the site. 64 In his autobiography, Abernathy reflected on how the rain hindered Resurrection City
and the campaign throughout the encampment’s six-week existence, “It was one of the wettest
springs in the history of the nation’s capital. Day after day, the gray skies poured water, huge
sheets that swept across the mall like the monsoons of India. The first day or two, it was an
adventure, sitting in the City Hall tent, listening to the persistent rapping of raindrops on the
canvas. But after a week the green grass that had provided us with a natural carpeting sank
under our feet into soft mud.” 65 Still, despite the unpleasant weather conditions, Resurrection
City’s physical size combined with the tension that permeated the entire encampment remain
fresh in the mind of Eddie Lee Webster Jr., a 16-year-old who traveled from his hometown of
Marks, Mississippi on the mule train to participate in the campaign. Reflecting on the
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atmosphere at Resurrection City, Webster remarked that, “It was humongous and you had
National Guard, state troopers and all. Then, you had to be careful because you didn’t
know…you walk outside Resurrection City, they might beat you and take you on to jail.” 66
While rain wreaked havoc on Resurrection City, Abernathy met with Bayard Rustin in New
York to plan Solidarity Day. Rustin organized the 1963 March on Washington in which an
estimated 250,000 people filled the Washington Mall and listened to a variety of speakers,
including King, who delivered his legendary “I Have A Dream,” address. Beyond meeting
Rustin in New York, Abernathy and other SCLC staffers stayed at the Pitts Motel at the start of
the campaign, which rankled residents of Resurrection City forced to cope with the constant rain
and thick mud. 67
Yet the campaign suffered from problems that went beyond an unpredictable stretch of
adverse weather. A combination of confusion and dissension among SCLC’s leaders plagued the
campaign throughout the first three weeks of Resurrection City. For example, on May 31, less
than two weeks after the protest phase of the campaign began, SCLC executive director Andrew
Young announced the reassignment of Jesse Jackson from manager of Resurrection City to a
new fundraising role in Chicago. Hosea Williams took over Jackson’s old position of “city
manager.” Although Young described the personnel change as a simple “shifting of gears,”
reporters perceived the move as a demotion for Jackson, the subject of a favorable profile in The
New York Times just a week before his departure. 68
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Within a week of Jackson’s exit from Washington, Bayard Rustin issued an ultimatum to
Abernathy. Speaking to reporters in New York on June 6, Rustin announced that, “Unless by
noon tomorrow, negotiations begin to give me complete authority, then I’m out.” Rustin’s
frustration resulted from a dispute over the goals of the campaign. In preparation for the
Solidarity Day demonstration, Rustin issued a l4-point list of demands from SCLC to convey the
organization’s goals for the campaign to Congress. After Rustin issued his request through a
statement on June 3, Williams labeled it “a lot of foolishness” and declared that the veteran civil
rights organizer had “no business” releasing the statement. 69 Rustin opted to appeal to
Abernathy in attempt to clarify that he possessed total control over the planning and execution of
Solidarity Day. Without an assurance from Abernathy, Rustin claimed that he could not recruit
the individuals and groups he needed to participate in the demonstration. 70
One day later, Rustin quit the campaign when Abernathy declined to provide him with the
authority he sought. Abernathy described the philosophical differences between SCLC officials
and Rustin as “a minor misunderstanding over goals” and he insisted that, “There is no rift
between us and there is not going to be any.” Rustin also declined to publicly criticize
Abernathy or SCLC. “Rev. Abernathy has not asked me to resign. If my resignation can dispel
discord that is harmful to our cause, I feel completely gratified.” According to Abernathy,
Rustin’s list did not include several of the campaign objectives, including a demand for the end
of American involvement in the Vietnam War. 71
While Abernathy contended that Rustin’s resignation represented a minor setback due to a
slight disagreement between the organizer and SCLC’s staff, reporters characterized the loss of
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Rustin as a major blow to the Solidarity Day march and the overall campaign. Two days after
Rustin’s resignation, Jean M. White reported “without Rustin there are fears that the June 19
rally might end in a whimper.” According to White, SCLC balked at Rustin’s request of
authority and his attempt to “define their vague demands into what he considers realistic goals.”
As a result, Abernathy’s decision revealed “SCLC, jealous of its ownership of the dream of
Martin Luther King, has made it clear that it wants to keep full control of the Poor People’s
Campaign.” 72
Ben A. Franklin echoed White’s sentiments in The New York Times. Franklin asserted that,
“Without Rustin, the June 19 march seems certain to fail, or at least to become something
altogether different from the planned day when ‘the non-poor and the middle class do their
thing,’ as S.C.L.C. officials used to call it.” Franklin viewed the stubborn refusal of militant
SCLC staffers to embrace “Rustin’s brand of old-line, respectable, highly organized, labor,
church and academic liberalism” for the march as a gaffe with the potential to undermine the
entire campaign. He contended: “The outlook immediately grew dimmer both for the future of
the Abernathy-King kind of nonviolent protest in general and for the Poor People’s campaign in
particular.” 73
When Ralph David Abernathy delivered his speech to conclude the Solidarity Day
demonstration on June 19, only about twenty percent of the march’s estimated 50,000
participants remained at the Washington Mall to hear his message. Abernathy struck a defiant
tone in his address as he proclaimed “We will not bow down to a racist Congress. We will not
bow down to an Administration that refuses to administrate to the nation the blessings of the
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poor. We will not bow down to the militarism and violence of this nation. I don’t care what they
do to me. If I must join Robert Kennedy and Martin King, I still will not bow.” He also
referenced the 1963 March on Washington and characterized the civil rights legislation passed in
the years between the two demonstrations as “broken promises.” 74
Abernathy’s speech capped an eventful day, which began with a one-mile march from the
Washington Monument to the Lincoln Memorial and featured speeches by a host of civil and
human rights leaders including NAACP executive director Roy Wilkins, UAW president Walter
Reuther, National Urban League executive director Whitney Young and King’s widow, Coretta
Scott King. Given the fact that Solidarity Day took place in the same venue as the 1963 march
and both demonstrations featured keynote addresses by SCLC’s president, many reporters and
columnists offered comparisons regarding the two protests. In addition to describing the smaller
crowd size, journalists noted that the Solidarity Day participants conveyed a different mood than
the hopeful spirit that underscored the earlier demonstration. One NAACP official remarked that
the casual attire worn by many marchers symbolized their anger and frustration with the
economic and social inequality present throughout America: “Five years ago this thing was
almost solidly middle class, and even the poor dressed their Sunday best. Yet the country has
failed to change, and there is disenchantment which affects them in so many ways.” 75
William Raspberry, a black columnist with the Washington Post, declared that, “by the
standard set on Aug. 28, 1963, Wednesday’s Solidarity Day affair was a pale thing.” Raspberry
noted the differences in behavior between the crowds at the two demonstrations, which he
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viewed as a shift in mindset that occurred in the five-year gap between the protests. According
to Raspberry, “There were little things, like people not being quite as polite as they were five
years ago when you could step on somebody’s foot and he’d smile and say, ‘Excuse me, please.’
But mainly it was the mood of 1963 that was gone, and as a result, the endless speeches and
songs and prayers, as good as some of them were, were little more than an all-day bore.”
Raspberry did not blame Abernathy or Sterling Tucker, Rustin’s replacement as Solidarity Day
coordinator, for what he viewed as a lackluster demonstration. Instead, he depicted the
demonstration as a microcosm of the entire campaign, “Nothing in particular went wrong
Wednesday; it’s just that nothing happened. Everybody knew nothing would happen, and
everybody was powerless to do anything about it.” 76
On June 24, 1968, less than a week after Solidarity Day, the remaining residents of
Resurrection City departed the encampment at the insistence of local police officers, who arrived
to oversee the evacuation of the residential community following the expiration of SCLC’s
permit the previous evening. Police arrested Abernathy at the U.S. Capitol, where he marched
along with close to three hundred followers to protest the closing of Resurrection City. As the
final residents vacated the encampment under the supervision of local police officers, Young
conceded that the challenge of operating a makeshift residential community consisting of a
diverse group of poor Americans took the focus away from the issues SCLC officials attempted
to illuminate during the six-week campaign. According to Young, “We got too bogged down in
Resurrection City and wasted a lot of energy here. In one sense, whoever it was that ran us out
of there maybe did us a real favor.” 77
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While Young expressed feelings of frustration and disappointment at the conclusion of the
Poor People’s Campaign and journalists such as William Raspberry lamented the fact that
“nothing happened” on Solidarity Day, Eddie Lee Webster Jr. believes the unity displayed by the
crowd mattered as much as the campaign’s tangible goals. According to Webster, singing along
with the crowd delivered a powerful message of camaraderie that underscored the goals of the
ordinary people that participated in the campaign, “That was the whole movement, you know.
The song and what the words say, that was [what] the whole march was about. It wasn’t about
just being poor or whatever. It was about standing up and not letting nobody turn you around or
whatever. It was about the will to accomplish something and that’s what most people liked
about it.” 78
The Poor People’s Campaign exposed the weaknesses of SCLC and foreshadowed the
struggles that Abernathy and the organization would encounter in the ensuing decade. The
dissension among the organization’s leaders did not disappear after the conclusion of the
campaign. Jesse Jackson continued to create problems for Abernathy and SCLC’s board of
directors in his role as director of Operation Breadbasket, the organization’s economic and
fundraising arm, before he resigned in a public split at the end of 1971. As Solidarity Day
demonstrated, the use of nonviolent protest, which worked well in desegregation campaigns
during the 1960s, proved ineffective in combating the more complex issue of economic
inequality in the 1970s. Hence, civil rights activists such as Young opted to pursue public office
because they believed politics represented the most effective method of utilizing nonviolence to
enact meaningful social and economic change. King told Abernathy that “you are the only one
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who could keep the team together,” in the event of his death. However, the team remained loyal
to King, despite the fact that Abernathy pushed for the same goals King outlined for the
campaign. 79
Furthermore, as historian Nick Kotz observed, in the months preceding his death, King
displayed public contempt for Lyndon Johnson, which resulted in an open feud between the two
men. A fundamental disagreement over the fate of antipoverty programs drove a wedge between
the men who worked together just a few years earlier on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
1965 Voting Rights Act. King believed Johnson should withdraw American troops from
Vietnam and increase federal funding for social programs designed to help the poor. As a lameduck president with declining approval ratings, Johnson had little incentive to work with
Abernathy, King’s closest associate and hand-picked successor. 80
Of course, Abernathy also committed some major mistakes during the campaign. The
inability to compromise with Rustin and keep him onboard damaged the credibility of the
campaign in the eyes of the press before Solidarity Day took place. Moreover, the fact that
Solidarity Day failed to resonate with federal government officials and journalists indicated that
the SCLC needed to revamp its strategy of spurring the government into passing legislation to
assist impoverished Americans. As Raspberry observed in his analysis of Solidarity Day, “What
Wednesday taught us, perhaps, is that the day of the demonstration as an effective civil rights
tool is over, that there can never be another Aug. 28, 1963.” 81 Yet Abernathy and his SCLC staff
continued to engage in nonviolent demonstrations for years to come
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CHAPTER TWO:
RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, SCLC, AND THE CHARLESTON HOSPITAL
WORKERS’ STRIKE

On April 26, 1969, Ralph David Abernathy composed a letter from his cell in the Charleston
County Jail. A year removed from his ascension to the presidency of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., Abernathy
borrowed a tactic his predecessor employed in Birmingham six years earlier. The letter served as
Abernathy’s response to a paid advertisement in the Charleston News and Courier in which a
group of 59 citizens urged the Concerned Clergy Committee to withdraw its support of the black
hospital workers’ strike against the Medical College of South Carolina (MCH) and the
Charleston County Hospital. In addition to refuting several of the group’s assertions against the
strikers, Abernathy outlined the strikers’ goal: “We will teach until South Carolina recognizes
the rights of its poor to organize and accept Local 1199B as the official bargaining agent for the
non-professional workers in Charleston’s county and University Hospitals.” 82
By the late 1960s, a significant shift had occurred in the objectives of SCLC. Following the
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the organization set its
sights on improving the economic conditions of African Americans in urban communities.
When King arrived in Chicago in 1966 to lead a campaign aimed at narrowing the income gap
between the city’s black residents and their white counterparts, SCLC’s senior staff members
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quickly realized that poverty represented the next obstacle facing African Americans in their
quest for equality.
Abernathy recalled encountering the stark reality of this challenge during an early visit to
Chicago with King, “By this time we realized that although we had won the legal right to check
into any hotel in the country, we still had problems checking out, because we didn’t have the
money to pay. In large measure that was the problem with the blacks living in Chicago. They
didn’t have the money to buy their way out of the squalor and degradation that surrounded
them.” 83 By December 1967, King began to plan a Poor People’s Campaign with the intent of
generating awareness of the millions of Americans living in poverty. King hired Bernard
Lafayette, a founder of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to the position of
program director for the SCLC and instructed him to begin organizing the venture. 84 The
assassination of King in the spring of 1968 thrust Abernathy into the spotlight as the new SCLC
president.
In the wake of the Resurrection City failure, Andrew Young, the SCLC’s executive vice
president, sought to rectify the growing friction within the organization’s senior staff by
scheduling a multi-day meeting in which a pair of psychiatrists observed and analyzed the issues
of contention. 85 Although the group therapy session helped clear the air among SCLC’s top
officials, the organization still lacked consensus on leadership and direction. King’s death
robbed SCLC of the dynamic personality capable of convincing staff members to put aside their
individual interests for the good of the organization. Unlike King, none of the remaining senior
staff members possessed the gravitas necessary to appeal to the various factions. Instead,
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Abernathy, Young, and Jesse Jackson each appealed to different factions of rank-and-file civil
rights supporters. 86
For Abernathy and SCLC, the Charleston strike forced the organization to move past the
failure of Resurrection City. It allowed a civil rights organization that seemed listless to regroup
and focus on a new campaign similar to the successful direct-action movements of the late 1950s
and early 1960s, such as the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Selma-to-Montgomery voting
rights march. Years later, Young contended that Charleston “was almost made-to-order as a
focus for the energies of an SCLC staff embroiled in the intrigue of succession. In contrast to the
Poor Peoples’ Campaign, the strike by Charleston hospital workers in the spring of 1969 had
clearly defined and achievable goals.” 87
The issue historians encounter when analyzing the Charleston hospital workers’ strike
involves the outcome of the campaign. Did the striking workers as well as the two national
organizations that led the movement, SCLC and Local 1199, the Retail, Wholesale, and
Department Store Workers Union gain the rights and benefits they sought? The answer to this
question varies depending on the group and the historian analyzing each group. For instance,
labor historians Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg concluded that the strike did not result in a clear
victory for either Local 1199, whose national leaders hoped to establish a strong affiliate of
unionized hospital workers in the city, or SCLC, whose leaders failed to mount any successful
national civil rights campaigns after Charleston.
Yet despite these setbacks, Fink and Greenburg noted that both organizations did accomplish
some of their goals. For SCLC, the strike ushered in a new era of political participation within
Charleston’s black community that featured a surge in black voter registration and the election of
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several African Americans to state and municipal public office. For example, in 1970,
Charleston’s Herbert U. Fielding became the first black citizen elected to the South Carolina
State House of Representatives since Reconstruction. 88 Historian Steve Estes also contends that
the strike illuminated the value of political power to Charleston’s black community, which
resulted in a dramatic increase in voter registration and turnout for local elections. 89
Local 1199 increased efforts for unionization in hospitals throughout the North in the wake
of the Charleston campaign. In one instance, a Baltimore hospital agreed to extend union
recognition to Local 1199 merely to avoid the possibility of a prolonged hospital workers’ strike
similar to the Charleston movement. Working alongside SCLC in Charleston also helped the
hospital union enhance its image as a supportive partner in the civil rights struggle. 90
While Fink and Greenberg assessed the role Local 1199 played in the campaign, Adam
Fairclough analyzed the Charleston strike strictly in terms of the SCLC’s participation. After
describing several of the SCLC’s victories in smaller scale campaigns involving school
desegregation and voting rights in Alabama, Fairclough labeled the strike as SCLC’s “most
impressive achievement” during the period from 1968-1971. 91 Christopher P. Lehman also
described the Charleston strike as a success for SCLC. Lehman viewed the participation of
prominent politicians such as Michigan congressmen John Conyers and Charles Diggs in
SCLC’s Mother’s Day rally on May 11 as an endorsement of Abernathy’s leadership of the civil
rights organization. 92 Lehman cited letters from Nixon administration officials, including
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George Schulz, the U. S. Labor Secretary, and Leon Panetta, Director of the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, shortly after the strike’s
conclusion as positive developments for Abernathy and SCLC. 93
By contrast, I argue that it was the most significant event in Abernathy’s long career as a
civil rights activist. The Charleston strike took place at a critical time for SCLC. The
organization’s transition to antipoverty campaigns began under King’s leadership and Abernathy
sought to build on his predecessor’s quest for economic equality. In the wake of Resurrection
City, the Charleston strike represented an opportunity for Abernathy to solidify his position as
the SCLC’s leader and carry the civil rights movement into a new decade with a different goal
than the campaigns for voting rights and legal access to public facilities. When Abernathy
accepted the invitation from Local 1199 to join the strike, SCLC became engaged in a campaign
for clear economic objectives and an effort to transform the method of nonviolent direct-action
protest into a truly “long” civil rights movement. 94
On March 22, 1969, Mary Moultrie, the leader of a group of a dozen hospital workers who
lost their jobs at the MCH following an attempt to unionize, sent a telegram to Abernathy. In her
telegram, Moultrie alerted the civil rights leader to the conditions the strikers faced from the
Charleston police department and the state-owned hospital’s hostile administration, “There have
been over twenty arrests in the last 3 days, and the viciousness of the police is steadily
escalating. The beatings and manhandling of black women must be brought to a stop. The antiunion terror campaign in Charleston must halt.” 95
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After Moultrie and her co-workers initiated the strike on March 20, SCLC quickly joined the
campaign, which also included Local 1199. The strike represented an opportunity for the two
organizations to achieve their individual goals by working together. For 1199, the strike
provided a chance to determine the feasibility of unionizing in South Carolina, a state with a
formidable anti-union business and political structure. For SCLC, the Charleston campaign
served as a chance to revive their efforts at waging a successful crusade against poverty in the
wake of the Resurrection City failure the previous summer. Moreover, due to the fact that some
local residents such as Dave Livingston, a white man who recruited black hospital workers in
Charleston for Local 1199, viewed the city’s daily newspaper, the News and Courier, as
“probably the most conservative newspaper in the state,” the fledgling union needed SCLC’s
presence to attract national media coverage of their struggle. 96
In the immediate aftermath of the 113-day strike, Abernathy labeled the strike as “the
outstanding achievement of this year” for SCLC and that its outcome “is a beacon of light” for
the working poor. 97 If the Charleston campaign ended in a significant triumph for SCLC and the
civil rights movement, as Abernathy and other SCLC participants such as Jack O’Dell declared,
one must identify any gains the hospital workers and African Americans achieved. According to
Young, “the key demands in the strike were: (1) union recognition, (2) an end of racial
discrimination in wages and hiring, and (3) rehiring of the twelve fired workers.” By the time
the strike concluded, state and hospital officials met all three of these demands. Yet hospital
administrators gradually eliminated the workers’ collective bargaining rights and the hospital
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remains a union-free workplace today. As a result, the strike failed to provide all of the
economic and workplace benefits sought by its participants. 98
Just over a week after Moultrie’s telegram to the SCLC leaders, Abernathy and Young
traveled to Charleston for the first of many lengthy visits during the course of the campaign in
the spring and summer. Speaking to a crowd of 1,500 at Fourth Baptist Church, Abernathy
stressed the reason for his trip, “I have come to Charleston on the invitation of the local leaders
and the hospital workers who are seeking to be organized into a bargaining force and lift the
level of economic plight in this city.” 99 Within two weeks of Abernathy’s first speech in
Charleston, SCLC’s involvement in organizing the strike escalated. In a letter to Esau Jenkins, a
local activist who participated in a variety of civil rights causes in Charleston throughout the
1950s and 1960s, Abernathy mentioned “a strong desire on the part of the staff for the 1969
SCLC Convention to be held in Charleston, South Carolina.” 100
By the time Abernathy returned to Charleston on April 21, the national media coverage Local
1199B craved materialized in the form of an article in The New York Times. The article
described a joint statement of unanimous support for the strike from fourteen of the nation’s
most prominent civil rights leaders, including Coretta Scott King, NAACP executive secretary
Roy Wilkins, Negro American Labor Council president A. Phillip Randolph, and National Urban
League executive director Whitney M. Young Jr. 101 The statement resonated with reporters
since it was the first public display of unity among different civil rights organizations since the
assassination of King. Three days after the story appeared, James A. Wechsler echoed a similar
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sentiment in his column in the New York Post. Under the headline “A Clear Cause,” Wechsler
wrote that the strike “has already produced one momentous national result. It has reunited civil
rights groups that had been mired in fruitless combat over “‘separatism’” and related issues.”
Wechsler also admitted that at the outset of the strike, he doubted it would gain national media
attention since it “could be so absent-mindedly dismissed as a ‘local South Carolina story.’” 102
In addition to the growing interest from media outlets outside of South Carolina, additional
workers joined the cause as eighty employees of the Charleston County Hospital went on strike
on March 28, eight days after Moultrie and the MCH employees left their jobs. The following
day, the Concerned Clergy Committee issued a proposal to resolve the strike. The “Peace With
Justice Proposal,” a document signed by thirty-four clergymen, featured several specific requests
from the ministers that they believed would expedite the process of reaching a settlement. They
called for “an impartially supervised election of workers in the non-professional category.” The
elected workers “should be empowered to deal with management and also be recognized as
spokesmen for the workers.” Following the installation of the elected committee, the proposal
stated that the workers should return to their jobs and refrain from further “agitation at work.”
Conversely, the clergymen urged the administration of the two hospitals “to reinstate all workers
who have been discharged and to drop all charges against the workers which have arisen in this
present strife.” 103
Although the striking workers succeeded in gaining support from national civil rights
organizations, attracting attention from national newspapers and magazines, and earning a
blessing to unionize from local clergymen, hospital administrators denied the employees’ request
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for a peaceful settlement. Instead, senior hospital and government officials, such as Governor
Robert E. McNair and MCH president William M. McCord, refused to budge. In response to the
Concerned Clergy Committee’s request for a diplomatic resolution to the impasse, McCord, who
frequently displayed a paternalistic attitude toward the hospital’s black employees, equated the
strike with an attack against the hospital’s patients. 104 Addressing a press conference days after
the clergymen issued their proposal and Abernathy’s speech at Fourth Baptist Church, McCord
succinctly stated that “a strike against the hospital is a strike against the patients.” He added that
“we cannot sanction lawlessness,” and the proposal’s call for reinstatement of all the striking
workers would force the hospital to bring back “12 persons who were fired for completely
disregarding patient care.” 105
While McCord refused to entertain any proposal that allowed the striking workers to return to
their jobs, McNair cited state law as the obstacle preventing a settlement with the union. He
informed the media of a law which barred state institutions, including the hospital, from
negotiating with union employees. According to McNair, if MCH officials opened negotiations
with the union, it would set a precedent that could result in collective bargaining with union
employees at other state-owned hospitals. 106
The strike intensified in late April when Abernathy led a morning march of 2,500 protesters
to the Medical College. When Abernathy and his supporters returned to the complex in the
evening, Charleston police officers arrested the SCLC president and 101 of his fellow marchers
for violating an injunction that limited the size of picket lines. Although Abernathy wrote the
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letter on April 26, the public did not learn of his note until six days later when it ran as a paid
advertisement in the News and Courier. 107
By the time Charleston’s citizens read Abernathy’s letter in their morning newspapers,
Coretta Scott King had arrived to lend her support to SCLC and the striking hospital workers.
Wearing a Local 1199 paper hat and a pair of sunglasses, she marched alongside hospital
workers to the Medical College on April 30. On May 1, King appeared in a full-page
advertisement in The New York Times. Along with a photo of a stoic King, the ad consisted of a
letter in which she implored readers to support the Charleston strike and “send the largest
contribution you can.” In addition, she wrote that with a victory for the hospital workers,
“Charleston can become that moment in our history when the unity of black and white, of the
civil rights movement with organized labor, may be regained.” In large bold letters, the words
“If my husband were alive today…he would be in Charleston, South Carolina!” flanked the
beginning and end of King’s letter. 108 Although she did not hold an official position with any
civil rights organization, King’s support solidified SCLC’s credibility with other national civil
rights groups and Charleston’s black citizens, whom she addressed later in the month at a rally
that attracted more than 2,000 people. 109
While the striking hospital workers mobilized behind Abernathy and followed him directly to
the Charleston County Jail and Coretta Scott King’s presence encouraged the strike’s supporters,
state and local political officials pushed back against the daily marches. Governor Robert E.
McNair issued a state of emergency on May 1 and instituted a 9 p.m.-5 a.m. curfew for the city
of Charleston and a portion of North Charleston. The curfew attempted to “cool down” the
107

William Walker Jr. and Stewart R. King, “Guardsmen Ordered Into Tense Charleston,” Charleston News and
Courier, April 26, 1969, 1-A.
108
Coretta King, Full Page Advertisement, The New York Times, May 1, 1969, SCLC Papers, Stuart A. Rose
Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University, Box 57, Folder 9.
109
Stewart R. King, “Support Growing, Strikers Are Told,” Charleston News and Courier, May 30, 1969, 12-A.

52

atmosphere, which McNair believed had grown uncomfortably tense with “widespread acts of
violence and threats of violence, common disregard for the law, and disorders of a general
nature.” Stewart R. King and Jack Roach, the News and Courier reporters who covered
McNair’s press conference noted that the governor’s declaration and SCLC’s unwillingness to
depart Charleston until the hospitals agreed to meet the strikers’ demands resulted in an
untenable stalemate between the two opposing sides. The reporters described the situation in
Charleston at the outset of May, “So it comes down to a battle of wills and cold nerve in a
powder magazine of emotion. No one can predict the winner. But Charleston clearly is the
almost certain loser.” 110
By the time McNair announced the mandatory curfew, the Charleston strike had generated
editorials from newspapers outside the Palmetto State. Outsiders viewed McNair’s
unwillingness to negotiate with the striking hospital workers, officials from Local 1199 and
SCLC as a poor strategic decision which might ultimately trigger a violent outcome similar to
the sanitation workers’ strike in Memphis just a year earlier. An April 30 editorial in the
Washington Post noted the similarities between Memphis and Charleston, “The authorities have
refused to meet with the union, insisting that wages and working conditions of public employes
[sic] are set by law and therefore not negotiable. Memphis held a similar hard-headed position
before Dr. King’s murder, but backed down afterward, spurred on by the tragedy and Federal
intervention at the request of President Johnson.” 111 The editorial concluded with a call for
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President Nixon to dispatch officials from either the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
or the Labor Department to Charleston in an effort to broker a settlement. 112
One day later, in a message that echoed the Post, members of the Charlotte Observer’s
editorial board weighed in on the strike. From the opening paragraph, the editorial served as a
rebuke of McNair, McCord, and the Charleston officials, “Official reaction to the Charleston,
S.C., hospital strike becomes more and more a case study in the wrong way to handle an
explosive labor-civil rights situation.” 113 The newspaper chastised the hospital and state officials
for failing “to recognize the potency” of the hospital workers’ cause, which “is ready made for
poor blacks—and indeed, poor whites—to rally around.” 114
Similar to the column that ran in the Post a day earlier, the Observer warned of the
consequences that awaited Charleston’s local officials if they continued to stubbornly refuse to
negotiate with the striking workers, SCLC, and Local 1199:
With each passing day, it becomes politically and practically more difficult to
break the Charleston impasse. But costly as it might be for hospital leaders to
admit the bankruptcy of their original tactics or, barring that, for Gov. Robert
McNair to take them off the hook by stepping in, such belated leadership would
be far cheaper than leaving a settlement to come after the sobering violence that
could make Charleston another Memphis or another Orangeburg. 115
Although prominent out-of-state newspapers openly criticized the inaction of hospital
management and state officials, McNair, perhaps emboldened by the support of the News and
Courier and a host of other South Carolina newspapers, maintained his position that the state
would not bargain with representatives of the striking workers. Editorials from other newspapers
around the state began to appear on the News and Courier opinion pages. On May 4, three days
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after McNair imposed the city-wide curfew, the Greenville News announced support for the
governor’s position in an editorial, “The struggle in Charleston may be long and bitter with the
ever present danger of major violence. But the stakes are enormous; the welfare of every South
Carolina citizen is bound up in the outcome…The position taken by the governor and the
General Assembly is that of the people of this state. Let that position be expressed in no
uncertain terms.” 116 Five days later, the Charleston newspaper published an editorial from The
State, Columbia’s daily newspaper, which supported McNair’s stance against granting collective
bargaining rights to public employees. According to the State, “He (McNair) simply cannot
allow the non-professional employees of the state and municipal hospitals at Charleston to be
represented by a union. That could easily open the floodgates. Other publicly operated hospitals
all over the state could easily topple into the union lair. And then perhaps government clerical
workers, policemen, firemen, teachers, garbagemen and what have you would get swept up in the
union movement.” 117 The News and Courier also published similar editorials of support for
McNair from the Spartanburg Herald and the Anderson Independent in the first ten days after
the governor imposed the curfew. 118
With the curfew in effect through the first ten days of May, Charleston emerged as “the
almost certain loser” 119 in the dispute that Stewart R. King and Jack Roach anticipated in their
May 2 story on McNair’s embargo of the city’s nightlife. The Port City’s merchants began to
feel the economic squeeze that resulted from an inability to conduct business after 9 p.m. every
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evening. Business at the city’s downtown Holiday Inn, which was forced to cancel “all of our
evening functions,” dropped precipitously with revenues falling from “around $900 a day to
$415 a day,” according to a hotel spokesman. 120 Another hotel manager estimated that the
curfew had cost his business between $30,000 and $40,000 in lost revenue from conventions
since approximately 2,000 guests canceled their reservations following McNair’s announcement.
Even businesses outside the curfew zone, such as Ashley Lanes, a bowling alley located beyond
the city limits, struggled to attract customers in the evening hours. According to Johnny Howe,
the alley’s operator, regular bowling leagues canceled their weekly appointments and revenues
after 9 p.m. dipped below $10 on average. Howe explained the dire financial predicament facing
his business as a result of the curfew, “I’m not even doing enough to pay the light bill. If this
thing continues, we’re going to have to close our doors before long.” 121
Abernathy and SCLC refused to wait while McNair, McCord, and other local officials
declined to negotiate with the striking workers. The civil rights group organized “The National
Mother’s Day Poor People’s March,” in order to generate support of the hospital workers. 122
The event began with entertainment provided by the Operation Breadbasket Band at 2 p.m. on
May 11 and consisted of nearly four hours of songs and speeches a rally prior to the march itself.
Accounts vary regarding the exact number of participants that joined Abernathy, Moultrie, and
the hospital workers for the three-mile march from County Hall on King Street through
downtown and past the city’s hospitals. According to John Kifner, the freelance reporter who
covered the event for The New York Times, 12,000 individuals marched alongside Abernathy
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through the streets of Charleston. 123 The News and Courier, citing two law enforcement
officials, including Charleston Police Chief John Conroy, estimated the crowd of marchers at
“more than 5,000 persons.” 124
Despite the discrepancy, the march represented a significant achievement for the strike’s
participants and organizers in the midst of the two-month standoff. Several prominent
politicians, including five members of the U.S. House Representatives, John Conyers Jr. (D-MI),
Charles Diggs Jr. (D-MI), Ed Koch (D-NY), Allard Lowenstein (D-NY), and William F. Ryan
(D-NY) marched with the striking workers. Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile
Workers, joined the marchers, presented a $10,000 check to Local 1199, and vowed to contribute
$500 per week to SCLC throughout the strike’s duration. 125
Emboldened by the success of the Mother’s Day march, Abernathy departed Charleston later
that evening to attend a May 13 meeting with President Nixon and the Urban Affairs Council to
discuss the nation’s poverty problem. The meeting left Abernathy and his acolytes as well as
Nixon and his cabinet officials and aides wary of forming any kind of alliance with each other to
address the poverty issue. Nixon’s staff took offense at the manner in which Abernathy
criticized the administration for their lack of attention to the plight of the nation’s poor, many of
whom were African Americans. At one point in the meeting Abernathy offered a particularly
insulting comment on his initial lack of confidence regarding the level of assistance the Nixon
White House might provide the poor people SCLC represented: “Let history show that this
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Administration, of which little was expected, was the one which made America truly keep its
long deferred promise to all of its citizens.” 126
Abernathy’s opening comment, coupled with a list of demands that he directed at the
Administration on issues ranging from assistance with the Charleston strike to $2.5 billion in
annual funding for a food program, did not sit well with Nixon or his aides. R. K. Price Jr., one
of Nixon’s speechwriters, believed Abernathy’s tone cost the poor people he claimed to
champion. In front of an audience consisting of Nixon, the Urban Affairs Council and several
members of the president’s cabinet, Abernathy, in Price’s estimation, had “wasted its time with
posturing, attitudinizing, sermonizing, and with pleading and wheedling directed not at the
problems of poverty, but at the requirements of his own brand of confrontation politics.” 127 The
meeting frustrated Nixon as well. In the wake of Abernathy’s description of a “disappointing
and fruitless” summit in his remarks to reporters, Nixon jotted a brief note to John Ehrlichman
and H.R. Haldeman, two of his senior advisers who arranged the meeting, “E-H, This shows that
my judgment about not seeing such people is right. No More of This!”128
When Abernathy reflected on the strike and his meeting with Nixon and the Urban Affairs
Council two decades later, he contended that the president’s refusal to intervene in the impasse
indicated a lack of concern for the working poor. As Abernathy saw it,
It was ironic that I should be invited there to consider the plight of the poor only a
few days after I had unsuccessfully appealed to this same president for help in
securing higher wages for the Charleston hospital workers. Had he really cared
about the poor, he might have used the prestige of his office to help settle the
strike. I certainly didn’t expect him to initiate national legislation, but a few
supportive words would have meant a great deal at that moment. Instead, he
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ignored my pleas, then welcomed me at the White House later as if I had never
asked for his help. 129

Abernathy chalked up the harsh remarks he delivered in a press conference immediately
following the meeting to the frustration he experienced while listening to assurances from White
House officials vowing to reduce poverty while strikers continued to march in Charleston with
the hope of improving upon their $1.30 per hour salaries. 130
Two days after Abernathy failed to persuade Nixon to intervene in the strike, a bipartisan
group of U.S. Senators issued the same request to the president. In a letter to Nixon, the group of
17 senators, led by Jacob K. Javits (R-NY) and Walter F. Mondale (D-MN), implored the
president to arrange for a federal mediator to help broker a settlement between the striking
workers and state officials. The senators warned the president that any failure to resolve the
strike in a nonviolent manner might lead Americans to abandon this concept as a method of
settling disputes, “The Charleston strike is a test of the principle of nonviolence at a time when
many in America are losing faith in that principle as a strategy for social change.” 131
The letter to Nixon failed to sway Gov. McNair, who offered an immediate rebuttal to the
concerned senators. Wary at the prospect that Nixon might actually heed the senators’ request
and send a federal mediator to negotiate a settlement, McNair opined that he considered it “quite
strange” that the senators chose to endorse the strikers’ “open and willful violation” of South
Carolina law. Instead of advocating for federal intervention, McNair thought the senators would
be “much more helpful if they would issue a call for public respect for the law and for placing
the care of the ill above selfish personal interests.” 132
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Nixon ignored the senators’ request for the appointment of a federal mediator to intervene in
the strike despite the fact that his immediate predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, utilized the same
strategy to settle the sanitation workers’ strike in Memphis the previous spring. In spite of his
dislike for King in the months preceding the Poor People’s Campaign, Johnson and his
administration did not ignore the participants at Resurrection City. During the early weeks of the
encampment, Vice President Hubert Humphrey visited the tent city alongside three mayors, John
Lindsay of New York City, Atlanta’s Ivan Allen Jr., and Walter E. Washington, the African
American mayor of Washington D.C. Humphrey, then in the midst of a presidential campaign,
publicly endorsed the campaign, “We in public office want to show our concern, on the one
hand, and to indicate the concern of all the American people, both black and white, for the plight
of the poor. You’re dramatizing to the American people the need of their fellow Americans who
are poor. This can be a very helpful educational experience.” 133 One year later, Abernathy and
SCLC discovered that Nixon, who received significant support from the South’s white
conservatives in the 1968 election, would not extend any public endorsements of civil rights
demonstrations. As a result, the dawn of the 1970s presented a formidable political challenge for
Abernathy and SCLC.
With both sides holding firm in their respective positions and no prospect for federal
intervention, Abernathy and his SCLC colleagues continued to organize marches and rallies. On
Thursday May 29, the day before Memorial Day weekend, Coretta Scott King returned to
Charleston and joined Abernathy and Moultrie at an evening rally at Stoney Field, a local
football stadium. Like the Mother’s Day march several weeks earlier, the size of the crowd
varied depending on the source. According to the Charleston News and Courier, the crowd
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numbered “more than 2,000 people.” 134 The New York Times reported the crowd consisted of
“more than 4,500 exuberant Negroes.” 135
The event featured a triumphant tone despite the fact that local government officials
remained steadfast in their refusal to negotiate with the strikers. King read a telegram of support
for the striking workers from Ethel Kennedy, the widow of former Sen. Robert F. Kennedy.
After questioning the collective inaction of the federal government, which she believed should
have threatened to withhold funding from the Medical College Hospital, King told the workers in
attendance that their efforts resonated with people throughout the nation, “For what began as a
little known strike by black hospital workers has captured the imagination and touched the
conscience of millions of Americans. The truth is that you are making history in Charleston.” 136
When Moultrie, one of the original dozen employees fired by the hospital more than two months
earlier, spoke to the crowd she directed her ire at McNair, “Mr. Governor, we’ve got something
that you’ll just never be able to beat. Not you, nor your cops, nor your National Guard. Because
Mr. Governor, we’ve got a winning combination (Local 1199B and the SCLC).” 137
Abernathy’s message lacked the dramatic rhetoric present in the speeches delivered by King
and Moultrie. The SCLC president reassured the crowd that his organization remained
committed to stay in Charleston for the duration of the strike, no matter how long it took for the
workers to receive an acceptable settlement from hospital officials, “I’ll tarry here awhile. It
might just be I’ll bring the SCLC conference in August to Charleston…the program committee
already has made the recommendation.” 138
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At the start of June, the possibility of a settlement between hospital management and the
striking workers appeared imminent. On June 2, McNair retracted the city’s curfew following 32
days of enforcement. Although he previously shortened the curfew twice, first from its original
eight-hour period (9 p.m.-5 a.m.) to a six-hour time frame (11 p.m.-5 a.m.) and subsequently to a
five-hour slot (midnight-5 a.m.), McNair waited until the conclusion of a relatively quiet
Memorial Day weekend before abolishing it altogether. 139
Three days after McNair lifted the curfew and exactly one week after Coretta Scott King
spoke at the Charleston rally, she finally received a definitive answer to the question she posited
regarding the U. S. government’s willingness to support the Medical College of South Carolina
through federal funding. In a June 5 letter to Dr. McCord, Hugh A. Brimm, a regional
compliance officer with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), ordered the
hospital to re-hire the dozen workers who lost their jobs while attempting to unionize two
months earlier. The letter represented the culmination of an 11-month investigation, in which
HEW officials determined the hospital failed to comply with civil rights regulations. If the
workers were not immediately restored to their previous positions with back pay, the hospital
would lose an estimated $12 million in federal funding. 140
Later that day, a meeting between the MCH board of trustees and a group representing the
hospital workers produced a settlement. McNair approved the preliminary proposals on June 10
and the lengthy strike appeared destined for a peaceful conclusion following months of strife and
turmoil. 141 In a startling turn of events, McCord withdrew the settlement offer on June 13. Two
of South Carolina’s biggest political heavyweights, U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond (R) and Rep.
L. Mendel Rivers (D), chairman of the House Armed Services committee and a staunch
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segregationist, met separately with HEW Secretary Robert H. Finch on June 12. Collectively,
the two legislators convinced Finch to examine the hospital to determine the accuracy of the noncompliance charges. In his public comments, Thurmond depicted the issue as a local personnel
matter to Billy E. Bowles, the Washington bureau reporter for the News and Courier.
“Ultimately,” he told Bowles, “any decision about the rehiring of the 12 employes [sic] in
question should rest with appropriate officials of the state and the Medical College of South
Carolina, not with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.” 142
Frustrated by the sudden withdrawal of a settlement offer, Abernathy and Hosea Williams, a
longtime SCLC staff member, attempted to lead a march of 300 supporters on the night of June
20. Charleston Police Chief John F. Conroy arrested the pair and their supporters reacted
violently by throwing “bricks, bottles, and other missiles” at police and members of the South
Carolina National Guard. Due to the violent outburst, which neither Abernathy nor Williams
instigated, both men were charged with “inciting to riot,” a felony with bail set at $50,000
each. 143
With Abernathy in jail, the level of violence on the streets of Charleston increased, including
frequent attacks on police officers and “nightly cases of arson,” despite SCLC’s consistent
requests for the strikers to engage in nonviolent protests. 144 As a result, the Nixon
Administration dispatched William Pierce, a federal mediator, to Charleston to negotiate a
settlement on June 24. Three days later, McCord agreed to a settlement that included the
rehiring of the twelve workers, whose employment status with MCH persisted as a sticking point
throughout the strike. The settlement also provided salary increases for the non-professional
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workers, the installation of a grievance process, and an employees’ credit union with voluntary
dues. 145
While McCord’s decision to settle with the striking MCH workers pleased Abernathy, he
elected to stay in jail until the local officials who operated the Charleston County Hospital
agreed to rehire all of their striking employees. On July 3, Abernathy walked out of his jail cell
to return to Atlanta, a little over two weeks before the remaining strikers reached a settlement
with the county hospital. 146 As he left Charleston, Abernathy promised supporters he would
return shortly. According to one of his SCLC colleagues, Abernathy would return “to do one of
two things—celebrate or demonstrate.” 147
The celebration that accompanied the peaceful resolution of the 113-day Charleston hospital
strike ended more quickly than many of its organizers envisioned. MCH officials gradually
eliminated the grievance procedure and employees’ credit union, the two key elements sought by
Moultrie and her Local 1199B colleagues. Without these components in place, hospital workers
essentially lacked collective bargaining rights as well as the funds and attention to mount another
attempt at unionization.148 Yet the workers’ salary increase, which now matched the federal
minimum wage, and the rise in political participation within the city’s black community served
as clear victories for the strikers. Years later, Moultrie recalled that as a result of the strike,
“People woke up to the fact that they needed to get out and vote.” 149
The four-month strike exacted a heavy toll on Abernathy and SCLC. The physical and
mental demands of initiating and participating in nonviolent direct-action civil rights campaigns
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for more than a decade caught up to the organization’s senior staff members. In a December
1969 interview with New York Times correspondent James T. Wooten, Andrew Young
commented on the group’s dire condition. “We’re not healthy,” he said. “We’re an exhausted
organization right now.” 150 Young also admitted that SCLC was “not really strong enough to
take on any national issues like Birmingham or Selma.” 151
Shortly after Wooten’s story ran in the Times’ December 25 edition, Young resigned from
his position as SCLC’s executive vice president in order to pursue a political career. Deprived of
its top administrator—Young had taken part in all of the negotiations in Charleston—and with
donors sending their discretionary income to Coretta Scott King for her ongoing project to
construct a memorial center to honor her late husband, Abernathy presided over an organization
plagued by a lack of resources and a dearth of meaningful campaigns to launch. By 1973, just
four years after the Charleston strike, SCLC, which once consisted of 125 staff members, was
left with just 17 employees. 152
Despite the SCLC’s gradual decline and the failure for both the civil rights organization and
Local 1199 to build on the momentum created by the fusion of “union power and soul power,”
the strike represented a departure from the setbacks suffered by SCLC in Chicago in 1966 and in
Resurrection City in 1968. 153 The Charleston strike demonstrated that SCLC could wage a
successful nonviolent direct-action campaign without the planning, organization, and leadership
of Martin Luther King. The workers received a tangible economic benefit with a wage increase
and Abernathy served as SCLC president for seven years following the strike.
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Charleston served as a culmination to the nonviolent direct-action campaigns that
characterized the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. As the 1970s arrived, veterans
of the nonviolent campaigns turned to political office as a means to continue their quest for
human rights and equality of opportunity. In addition to Young, who served two terms in
Congress before representing America as the nation’s first black U.N. Ambassador and serving
two terms as Mayor of Atlanta, former SNCC chairman John Lewis won a seat in Congress in
1986 and remains an active member of the House of Representatives and former SNCC cofounder Julian Bond served six terms in the Georgia State Legislature from the mid-sixties to the
mid-eighties. Even Abernathy sought political office. He ran for the congressional seat Young
vacated after accepting the U.N. ambassadorship in 1977. More importantly, though the success
of Charleston proved fleeting, the presence of SCLC in one of the South’s oldest and most
segregated cities provided hope for Charleston’s black citizens to become politically active and
engaged. Young remembers the enthusiasm present throughout the campaign, “When I think of
the Charleston strike today, I remember the ebullient spirit of the people, not the negotiating
sessions or what we gained from the settlement. Charleston was the singingest, preachingest,
clappingest movement since our days in Albany and Selma. In the mobilization of the
community, there was a spirituality infused into the marches and the meetings that will always
remain with me as an enduring memory.” 154
Like Young, Abernathy’s memories of Charleston seem limited to the immediate impact of
the concessions won by SCLC and the striking workers. He contended that “In many ways the
Charleston victory had been the most unambiguous we had achieved since Selma, though it by
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no means had such far-reaching implications.” 155 In Abernathy’s view, the Charleston strike
solidified his position as SCLC leader:
In addition, I had won a personal victory. The Poor People’s Campaign had been
conceived and planned under Martin’s leadership, and whatever positive gains we
made were attributed to him, while the failures were attributed to me. But the
Charleston campaign had been planned and executed under my leadership, and
some of the remaining doubters had been silenced. For the first time people were
beginning to believe that the SCLC would have a life and a purpose beyond
completing the projects already begun by Martin. 156
The gradual decline of SCLC in the second half of 1969 and the early years of the 1970s,
however, suggest that Charleston marked the conclusion of the organization’s standing as a
powerful civil rights group capable of engaging in large direct-action campaigns. Yet
Abernathy remained committed to antipoverty campaigns for the remainder of his tenure as
SCLC president and after he resigned from the organization in 1977. As he explained, “It was
for that segment of our population—the least fortunate of our brothers and sisters—that Martin
gave his life and I worked during my tenure as SCLC president.” 157
A more glaring problem for Abernathy involved his decision to continue emulating King.
While few people expected Abernathy to veer from King’s message and strategy during the Poor
People’s Campaign due to the fact that King originally planned the encampment and
Abernathy’s unfamiliarity in the position of SCLC’s president and public face, he missed an
opportunity to establish his own identity as a leader. By writing his own jailhouse letter during
the strike, Abernathy attempted to persuade Charleston’s residents of the necessity for salary
increases and collective bargaining for the city’s hospital workers. Instead, the “Letter from
Charleston County Jail” failed to resonate with the public. Reflecting on the letter twenty years
later, Abernathy conceded that, “I tried to imitate Martin and wrote a letter from a Charleston
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jail, but no words of indignation came from the national newspapers, no marching crowds poured
into Charleston.” 158
The Charleston strike represents an extension of the chronology of the SCLC’s direct-action
campaigns of the civil rights era. The organization’s nonviolent protests did not conclude with
the triumphant tone of the 1965 Selma to Montgomery voting rights march or with the somber
mood of the Memphis sanitation workers’ strike after King’s death. Instead, this era ended with
the 1969 Charleston strike, a campaign that resulted in tangible gains for Abernathy and the
strike’s participants as well as unfulfilled goals in the years to come.
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CHAPTER THREE:
‘WE HAVE NO SUPERSTARS AT THE MOMENT’

On May 23, 1970, Ralph David Abernathy spoke in front of the last major rally of a directaction campaign during his tenure as SCLC president. Speaking to a crowd estimated at “close
to 10,000 persons,” Abernathy declared that, “over the last 15 years, there has grown to maturity
a movement here in the South, with national and international support, that is determined to
establish freedom and representative government and an end to the tyranny of racism and war,
and we are determined to do it in this decade of the seventies.” Abernathy delivered his remarks
at a rally that served as the culmination of a “march against repression” that spanned five days
and 110 miles from Perry, Georgia to Atlanta in the wake of multiple high-profile shootings by
law enforcement officials in May 1970. 159 Within a two-week period, four anti-war
demonstrators died at the hands of the Ohio National Guard at Kent State University, police
officers killed two black students at Jackson State College and six young African American
protesters in Augusta, Georgia. The Augusta shooting spurred Abernathy and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) into action. At the funeral of Sammy McCullough, a
nineteen-year-old victim of the Augusta shooting, Abernathy announced plans for the march.
The SCLC president argued that America suffered from a “national climate of fear and
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repression which has been created by a national Administration in pursuit of a racist political
Southern strategy and a militaristic foreign policy.” 160
In addition to Abernathy, the rally featured speeches from Coretta Scott King and U.S.
Senator George McGovern (D-SD). McGovern blasted the Nixon Administration for its divisive
rhetoric and a political strategy that enhanced tension and distrust between America’s white and
black citizenry. The senator declared, “The kind of Southern strategy that makes sense is the
kind that we have here today. We cannot afford to expend our energies hating each other. We
cannot afford to set worker against student, youth against age, white against black. There will be
no end to the violence against hunger and division in America until we end the violence that is
devouring our blood and resources in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.” 161
In her address to the crowd, King absolved African Americans of blame for the recent
shootings, “America, we are not your enemy. Your enemy are those forces of repression in the
nation that will silence all dissent in this nation by any means possible.” 162 In addition to the
presence of Abernathy and King, the march featured participation from members of Georgia’s
NAACP chapters, which co-sponsored the demonstration. 163 By the end of the 1960s, the
NAACP and the SCLC represented America’s two most prominent civil rights organizations.
Yet the two groups did not always cooperate in the planning and organizing of direct-action
campaigns for civil rights advances. For instance, two years before the Perry-to-Atlanta march,
the NAACP did not participate in the Poor People’s Campaign.
At the conclusion of the rally in Atlanta, SCLC activists expressed a sense of optimism about
the direction of the organization and the future of the black freedom struggle at the dawn of a
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new decade. One SCLC staffer explained the significance of the march and rally to a reporter,
“We needed this. Doc [Mr. Abernathy] needed it, S.C.L.C. needed it, the black people needed it
and so did the nation.” Another SCLC worker characterized the enthusiasm and solidarity
among the march’s participants as “just like Selma to Montgomery—like Birmingham and like
the demonstrations in Montgomery.” In addition to SCLC activists, the march’s white
participants also described the camaraderie that existed among marchers of both races during the
demonstration. According to one white marcher, “This is the first time white people are not
marching out of guilt. This is the first time they are marching because they can see that they
must act against repression that could crush us all.” 164
Although the march from Perry to Atlanta rekindled the spirit of some of SCLC’s greatest
triumphs of the 1960s and the speeches delivered by Abernathy, King, and McGovern stirred
passion among the thousands who attended the rally, the organization failed to build on the
momentum established by the event. Within three months of the rally, Abernathy identified the
reasons for the economic inequality that plagued the nation. In a commencement speech at
Bethune-Cookman College, Abernathy proclaimed that the U.S. government’s commitment to
the space program siphoned valuable funds from fighting poverty, which he viewed as the
nation’s greatest problem. According to Abernathy, collecting rock samples from the moon
diverted attention from the uncomfortable reality of starving children in the rural South, “Vice
President Spiro Agnew went around the world giving samples of those rocks to hads [sic] of
state—when he ought to be traveling in Alabama and Mississippi passing out bread to starving
children.” 165
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Unable to mount a large-scale national direct-action campaign such as the Poor People’s
Campaign or the 1965 Selma-to-Montgomery voting rights march, SCLC engaged in local
protests during the early seventies. For example, the organization launched a protest in Butler,
Alabama during the fall of 1971. On September 11, a white motorist struck and killed Margaret
Ann Knott, a nineteen-year-old black woman as she participated in a sit-in demonstration on the
streets of Butler, located in rural Choctaw County, a county with a near even split of African
Americans and whites among its 17,000 residents. Knott’s death heightened racial tension in a
region where blacks began a boycott of white-owned businesses three and a half months earlier
and roughly ninety percent of the black students at county schools sat out the first two weeks of
the 1971-72 academic year. 166
Abernathy traveled to Butler to speak at Knott’s funeral on September 14. Identifying Knott
as “one more black martyr” in “the struggle for what is right,” Abernathy announced plans for a
march in Butler the following day. In his remarks to the crowd of 2,500 attendees, Abernathy
declared, “We’re going to march tomorrow and the next day and the next and however long it
takes to guarantee that people won’t have to die for their rights.” Leon Clark, the local sheriff,
told a visiting reporter that any march would violate a court order prohibiting public
demonstrations and result in the arrest of the protesters, “If they march tomorrow, they’re going
to be arrested.” 167
Clark’s warning failed to deter Abernathy and Butler’s black residents. On September 15,
Abernathy led a march of 154 protestors through the streets of Butler. State troopers arrested all
of the demonstrators and the apprehension of an additional 39 black youths for a variety of
offenses ranging from disturbing the peace and destruction of public property to making a false
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bomb threat resulted in a total of 193 arrests. With Abernathy incarcerated at the Choctaw
County jail, two other SCLC officials, board chairman Joseph Lowery and Bernard Lee,
Abernathy’s executive assistant, traveled to Butler. After they arrived in town, Lee proclaimed,
“We have decided this is the place to stand our ground.” 168
Choctaw County’s black residents began their boycott to protest the previous spring’s firing
of eight black schoolteachers and the lack of black officers on the city’s police force and deputies
in the county sheriff’s department. 169 Following months of relatively uneventful peaceful
protests, the death of Knott enticed Abernathy to speak at her funeral and remain in town to lead
demonstrations. Abernathy’s visit to Butler generated coverage of the previously unknown black
freedom struggle in Choctaw County in The New York Times, which dispatched a reporter to the
town to cover the funeral and subsequent protests. In addition, newspapers such as the Chicago
Tribune, the Washington Post, and the Atlanta Constitution published the Associated Press wire
story of the arrest of Abernathy and the other marchers.
The incarceration of Abernathy and the media coverage that accompanied it brought local
leaders from the county’s white and black communities and SCLC officials to the negotiating
table. The two sides reached an agreement just before Abernathy posted bond and walked out of
the Choctaw County jail, three days after his arrest. Terms of the agreement included a
stipulation that called for the hiring of a black deputy by the county sheriff’s department and a
black police officer by the city along with a promise to create an assistant school superintendent
position for an African American pending the availability of federal funds. In addition, the
accord permitted black children to return to county schools “without reprisal,” left open the
possibility that one of the fired teachers “would be given an opportunity for re-employment,” and
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established a local biracial advisory board. In return for these concessions, the county’s black
leaders agreed to a 45-day moratorium on public protests. After his release from the county jail,
Abernathy spoke of the agreement in grandiose terms in an address to the city’s jubilant black
residents, “I hail this not only as a victory for black people but for all poor people in southwest
Alabama. I count this as the greatest victory SCLC has ever achieved since I have been
president, and also the greatest victory by SCLC since its inception.” 170
Abernathy’s frequent use of bold rhetoric in his public remarks served as the most
distinguishing characteristic between his stint as SCLC president and King’s tenure as the
organization’s leader and public face. In the week before the opening of Resurrection City, UPI
reporter Louis Cassels noted that the language and tone of Abernathy’s public comments
represented a sharp departure from the intellectual appeals made by King, whose speeches
resonated with white liberals and the black middle class. Cassels observed that, “Compared to
King, Abernathy is less polished and articulate. He lacks King’s cool poise and personal
magnetism. He is an angrier man. He speaks more bluntly. He says he intends to be more
militant than King, and those who have seen him in action during the past six weeks are inclined
to believe him.” 171 During an interview with the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in 1975,
Abernathy viewed a series of internal memos from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Vice
President Spiro Agnew in which the two men depicted Abernathy as a serious threat. According
to Abernathy, the two men concurred on the need to “silence” the SCLC president during the
Poor People’s Campaign in 1968. Abernathy boasted that Agnew wrote in a memo to Hoover,
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“We’ve got to stop this Ralph David Abernathy because I have discovered that he is one of the
most dangerous of all the black leaders.” 172
Given his penchant for blunt rhetoric, Abernathy’s comments on the resolution in Butler
come across as an exaggerated assessment of the accord’s significance by an exuberant leader
basking in the immediate aftermath of a clear victory. Years later, in an autobiography that
spanned 620 pages, Abernathy did not include a single word about the Butler demonstrations. If
Abernathy viewed Butler as “the greatest victory SCLC has ever achieved since I have been
president and, also the greatest victory by SCLC since its inception,” it stands to reason that the
event would occupy a significant space within his autobiography. By contrast, he devoted an
entire chapter to the 1969 Charleston hospital workers’ strike. In his study on the SCLC, Adam
Fairclough spends just two sentences on the Butler protests. In the same chapter, Fairclough
asserts that the Charleston strike represented “SCLC’s most important achievement” during
Abernathy’s presidency. 173
During the final years of King’s life, Jesse Jackson joined SCLC. Jackson participated in
many of the organizations campaigns including the Selma-to-Montgomery voting rights march in
1965 and the Memphis sanitation workers’ strike in 1968. Jackson energized the organization
with his commitment to improving economic opportunities for African Americans and his
formidable talents as a public speaker. Abernathy noticed Jackson’s ability to inspire audiences
during the Selma campaign: “Though not a preacher with a permanent pulpit, he could take the
language of the sermon and translate it into the language of practical politics and that made him
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an extraordinary leader of black people—something I recognized in him the first time I heard
him speak at Selma.” 174
In addition to his leadership skills, Jackson possessed an entrepreneurial spirit and an
attraction to the spotlight. These personality traits occasionally created internal conflict within
SCLC during King’s presidency, but King possessed the gravitas to maintain a cohesive
environment within the organization and senior staff members, including Jackson, put aside their
personal ambitions for the benefit of the organization. Jackson directed Operation Breadbasket,
a Chicago-based SCLC program that through a variety of methods, including organized boycotts
of individual companies, aimed to increase black employment at businesses and corporations that
depended on black customers. In a meeting that took place days before he returned to Memphis
for the final time, King attempted to convince SCLC staff members on the necessity to return to
Memphis after an ill-fated protest in late March. According to Andrew Young, King told
Jackson, James Bevel, and Hosea Williams why they needed to join him in Memphis instead of
focusing on their individual pet projects. Speaking directly to Jackson, King said, “Look,
whenever you needed me or wanted me to come to Chicago, I’ve always been there supporting
your efforts. Now when we’re trying to get a national movement going, I don’t really have your
support.” 175
Jackson relented and joined King in Memphis. After King died, Jackson lied to reporters
with a false story that the SCLC president died in his arms. Despite this fabrication, Jackson
served as city manager of Resurrection City until Abernathy and Young reassigned him and
installed Williams into the position at the end of May 1968. As Gerald McKnight notes, “Some
of King’s lieutenants harbored deep resentment against Jackson for what they regarded as his
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tasteless, self-serving behavior at the time of the civil rights leader’s assassination. Jackson
engrossed the media with his fake story of reaching the stricken leader first and cradling the
dying King in his arms.” 176 Abernathy contended that King grew frustrated with Jackson’s
ceaseless pleas for permission to launch new initiatives that would result in tremendous gains in
funds and publicity for the SCLC. According to Abernathy, “After Martin was killed, I inherited
the problem of Jesse’s entrepreneurial zeal along with the other assets and liabilities of the
SCLC. The difference between me and Martin, however, was that I was less inclined to say ‘no’
and more inclined to say ‘maybe’; and for Jesse ‘maybe’ invariably translated into ‘yes.’” 177
By December 1971, less than three months after the resolution of the Butler demonstrations,
Jackson’s freewheeling actions forced the SCLC to intervene with the administration of
Operation Breadbasket. In 1969, Jackson organized Black Expo, a trade fair accompanied by
performances and appearances by entertainers, in Chicago. SCLC sponsored Black Expo, which
brought in $66,000 in funds for the organization in 1969, according to Abernathy. 178 Jackson
administered Black Expo with little oversight from SCLC’s national office in Atlanta.
With Jackson coordinating Black Expo, Abernathy and his staff focused on SCLC’s other
projects as well as the day-to-day operations of the organization. On September 29, 1970,
Jackson formed Black Expo Foundation. Both Illinois state regulations and federal law required
foundations and charitable trusts to provide a financial report on an annual basis that included all
of the organization’s revenues and expenditures. In addition, Illinois regulations stipulated that
all new foundations and trusts needed to register with the offices of the state’s attorney general
and secretary of state. Nearly a year after the formation of the foundation, Jackson, who never
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completed the required registration for Black Expo Foundation, created a corporation, Black
Expo, Inc., which qualified for tax exempt status from the IRS. Moreover, Illinois did not
require financial disclosures from corporations. Jackson formed Black Expo Foundation,
allowed the foundation to dissolve through a failure to register with the state, and created Black
Expo, Inc., without the knowledge of Abernathy or any member of the SCLC’s board of
directors. 179 Abernathy first learned of Jackson’s activities with the foundation and the
corporation when a reporter from the Chicago Tribune confronted him at Atlanta’s Hartsfield
Airport as he returned from another trip. When the reporter presented Abernathy with documents
which identified Black Expo, Inc. as a private corporation with its own board of directors rather
than an affiliate of the SCLC, he realized that the organization needed to deal with a serious legal
problem. A contingent of SCLC officials that included Abernathy and the board of directors
traveled to Chicago to examine the legal questions involving Black Expo, Inc. and conduct a
meeting with Jackson. 180
At the conclusion of a day-long hearing with Jackson on Friday December 3, the SCLC
levied a 60-day suspension with pay against the Operation Breadbasket director and the
organization announced plans to conduct a comprehensive investigation into Black Expo, Inc.
and Jackson’s actions. Joseph Lowery, chairman of the SCLC’s board of directors, proclaimed,
“This action is solely related to Rev. Jackson’s repeated violations of organizational policies as
an employed member of the SCLC staff and there is no indication of any fiscal dishonesty.” 181
Jackson attended Operation Breadbasket’s Saturday night meeting the day after the
announcement of his suspension. As a “guest speaker,” Jackson told a crowd of “more than
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3,000 blacks” his relationship with Abernathy remained strong and the suspension did not signify
a rift between the two men. Instead, Jackson blamed Angela Parker, the Tribune reporter who
broke the story of his covert financial activity with Black Expo, Inc., for the suspension he
received. As Jackson saw it, “The issue is that last Friday a black woman reporter left Chicago
with her mission being to separate great black men. She took a plane from the Tribune Tower to
Atlanta. Now you know who your enemy is.” 182
After attending the meeting and hearing Jackson’s accusation against her, Parker called
Abernathy to get his reaction for the story. The SCLC president absolved Parker of any
culpability for Jackson’s suspension. Abernathy explained:
Miss Parker did not give me the impression that she is an enemy of the black man,
nor that she was seeking to destroy our organization even tho [sic] Miss Parker
may have been seeking to accomplish this goal. She gave me the impression,
however, that she had the welfare of black and poor people and the movement at
heart and was seeking to bring to my attention some violations, which if not
corrected, certainly might destroy the most live and vibrant human rights
organization in our nation today. 183

Toward the end of her story, Parker included reaction from Anna Langford, an alderman on
Chicago’s city council and a spokeswoman for the board of directors of the local SCLC chapter,
which illustrated the tremendous support for Jackson in the city. When asked what she thought
of the national board’s charges of Jackson’s “repeated violations of organizational policy,”
Langford asserted that “if Jackson is guilty, the board, too, was guilty.” 184 The combination of
the large crowd turnout and the vote of confidence in Jackson issued by Langford on behalf of
the local SCLC chapter demonstrated that Jackson did not need Operation Breadbasket and the
SCLC to maintain his influence as a leader of Chicago’s black citizens.
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Eight days after the announcement of his suspension, Jackson informed Abernathy of his
decision to resign from the SCLC in a telegram. Jackson explained that the length of his
suspension left him with no alternative options because, “60 days is too long for Operation
Breadbasket to go without leadership.” In The New York Times, Seth S. King depicted the
resignation as the culmination of a rift between Jackson and Abernathy that originated the
previous spring when the SCLC president demanded the relocation of Operation Breadbasket
from Chicago to Atlanta, an order which Jackson refused. 185 King contended that Jackson’s
resignation “also signaled a struggle for leadership of the national black community mobilized
by the late Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.” 186
Jackson held a press conference at the Saturday meeting of Operation Breadbasket to inform
his supporters of his resignation. Free from the authority of SCLC, Jackson admitted that his
philosophical differences with Abernathy resulted in a strained relationship between the two civil
rights leaders, “When it becomes clear two people cannot work together, they should amicably
divorce.” Speaking about Abernathy, Jackson added, “I’m glad we have the same goals, but the
problem is we are choosing different roads. Progress is impaired when inner conflict diverts us
from our course of action. When education and welfare should have made headlines these last
few weeks, bridges between myself and Dr. Abernathy have hidden the real problems and the
papers have dealt with a personality called Jesse.” 187
Although Jackson insisted that he would create a new organization without SCLC’s assets,
one Jackson biographer noted that, “in fact, he transported with him into PUSH not only all of
Breadbasket’s files and office equipment but most of its membership, including its entire staff of
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twenty-five, and all but five of its thirty-five board members.” 188 Within one day of Jackson’s
resignation, a group of influential black businessmen and politicians met in New York’s
Commodore Hotel, where they decided to support Jackson in the establishment of a new “black
economic development organization.” Carl Stokes, the former mayor of Cleveland, Richard
Hatcher, the mayor of Gary, Indiana, and entertainer Ossie Davis attended the meeting along
with singers Aretha Franklin and Roberta Flack. Serving as the group’s spokesman, Stokes
explained the reason for the hastily scheduled meeting, “Many of us felt we could not lose the
leadership of this young man.” Stokes attempted to absolve Abernathy of responsibility for the
group’s decision to support Jackson by declaring, “This is in no way a reproach against S.C.L.C.
and the Rev. Ralph David Abernathy.” Yet he confirmed that the group agreed to offer
“financial, physical, moral, and professional support” for “a new framework or vehicle” that
would allow Jackson to “continue the new thrust in the area of economic development.” 189
With the SCLC’s Chicago chapter dormant in the wake of Jackson’s departure, questions
about the organization’s future began to surface at the beginning of 1972. As the fourth
anniversary of King’s death approached, a reporter examined the state of the SCLC in a New
York Times article. One of the main reasons cited for SCLC’s struggle to maintain its position as
an effective human rights organization capable of planning and leading large-scale nonviolent
demonstrations involved a decline in both financial resources and manpower. At the height of
King’s presidency in the mid-sixties, SCLC operated with a staff of 150 along with an additional
1,000 volunteers. The organization’s operating budget during these years often surpassed $1
million. By the time Jackson resigned at the end of 1971, the SCLC’s full-time staff consisted of
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61 employees and its operating budget fell to $917,000. 190 Since most of SCLC’s successful
campaigns after King’s death took place at the local level in the South, Roy Reed reported that
some of the organization’s supporters thought Jackson’s departure “might prompt the conference
to refocus its prime attention on the South.” Reed noted, “A few of Dr. King’s advisers thought
it was a mistake for him to take the organization into the North when he opened his Chicago
campaign for economic equality in 1966.” 191
The article concluded with the remarks of two black men who followed King but did not
work for SCLC and they contended that the organization along with other civil rights groups
lacked the ability to enact meaningful change in the 1970s. Dr. Vincent Harding, director of the
Institute for the Black World in Atlanta, an organization previously affiliated with the Martin
Luther King Jr. Memorial Center, asserted that, “When one speaks of the Urban League, of
S.N.C.C., of CORE, of S.C.L.C., of the N.A.A.C.P., it is almost as though he is speaking of
ghosts because the era of civil rights is over. Yet our movement, on the whole, has not moved
forward with the times. We still rely too strongly on the strategies of the past, strategies no
longer adequate to the present and future needs of black America.” Ivanhoe Donaldson, an
African American working as a Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, offered a
blunt assessment of the state of the civil and human rights movements, “We have no superstars at
the moment in terms of the civil rights and peace movements. And maybe there’s no need for
one.” 192
Three weeks after the publication of the Times article, Abernathy returned to Chicago.
Speaking at the inaugural “Recall to Commitment Rally” at Mt. Pisgah Baptist Church,
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Abernathy told a crowd of nearly 800 people that the SCLC remained committed to Chicago,
“I’ve come to reiterate the fact that SCLC is still burning in Chicago and will be here as long as
justice reigns.” In a clear reference to Jackson’s comments at the press conference where he
announced his resignation nearly six weeks earlier, Abernathy defended the SCLC’s methods of
pursuing economic opportunities and social change, “There are those who say that the tools we
use to gain our freedom are outdated, but we’re in Chicago on a mission…and, if we perish, we
perish.” Abernathy announced Operation Breadbasket’s new leadership team of C.T. Vivian,
executive director of SCLC’s Chicago chapter, and Noah Robinson, Jackson’s half-brother, as
Breadbasket’s new director. 193
Even with a new leadership team and renewed commitment from SCLC’s national office, the
organization’s Chicago affiliate struggled to raise money and remain relevant after Jackson’s
departure. By mid-January 1972, Jackson launched Operation PUSH (People United to Save
Humanity) and his new organization continued to raise funds from Chicago’s black community.
In March, Vivian accused Jackson’s staff at Operation PUSH of “weakening SCLC’s ability to
operate in the black community.” According to Vivian, “Operation PUSH’s refusal to give us an
accounting of Black Expo funds and to return all our files and furniture has made it difficult for
us to operate in the way we should.” 194
In addition to competing for funds against Operation PUSH, SCLC’s Chicago chapter
suffered from internal problems. At the 1972 SCLC annual convention in Dallas, held just seven
months after the organization announced its new leadership team in Chicago, Abernathy and the
board of directors conducted a five-hour staff meeting to resolve a power struggle between
Vivian and John L. Thurston, president of the Chicago chapter. Vivian resigned from his
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position days before the meeting took place on August 17. Similar to the rift between Operation
Breadbasket and SCLC’s national office that resulted in Jackson’s resignation the previous year,
the feud between Vivian and Thurston stemmed from a dispute over the finances of the
organization’s Chicago affiliate. Members of the Chicago chapter’s board of directors accused
Vivian of “excessive spending and excessive salaries” for staff members that he hired without
the approval of the local board. According to Thurston, who presented his complaints about
Vivian’s actions to Abernathy and the organization’s national board, “Dr. Abernathy listened to
the whole discussion, and he said that whatever was decided about the Chicago chapter would be
up to the board and me as president.” 195
Financial woes continued to present a formidable challenge for Abernathy and SCLC in
1973. In order to stay alive, the organization reduced its staff to just 17 full-time employees by
the end of 1972. The organization’s annual operating budget, which peaked at $4 million in
1968 when donors filled SCLC’s coffers in the wake of King’s assassination, topped out at
$500,000 in 1972. By April, Abernathy remained unsure if the 1973 budget would match the
previous year’s total. 196 Abernathy explored all options to increase the organization’s funds and
manpower, including meeting with Jackson in early March to discuss a potential merger with
Operation PUSH. The common challenge of raising money and building an organized
opposition to Richard Nixon’s domestic policies brought the two men together to discuss
collaboration opportunities for the two organizations. 197
Within two weeks of their initial meeting, Abernathy and Jackson announced plans to lead a
series of marches and demonstrations to protest Nixon’s economic policies. At a news
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conference at PUSH’s Chicago headquarters, where leaders from SCLC, the National Welfare
Rights Organization, and PUSH conducted a two-day strategy session, Abernathy declared
Nixon’s policies prompted the collaboration of the organizations in spite of any previous
disagreements. “But Richard M. Nixon is going to bring us closer together.” He continued,
“Whatever differences we had were all in the family.” Despite the united front displayed by
Abernathy and Jackson at the press conference, the PUSH leader refuted reports of a potential
merger with SCLC. 198
Three weeks later, on the fifth anniversary of King’s assassination, Abernathy and Jackson
led a group of 500 demonstrators on a march through downtown Atlanta. Beginning at King’s
former church, Ebenezer Baptist, Abernathy and Jackson led marchers to the Georgia Capitol
building and Atlanta’s City Hall before reaching Herndon Stadium on the campus of Morris
Brown College, where they addressed the crowd of fellow demonstrators. At City Hall,
Abernathy read a list of demands for Atlanta mayor Sam Massell and left a copy of the list with a
secretary. When Abernathy called for the dismissal of John Inman, the city’s police chief, a
chant of “Fire Inman” broke out among the marchers. Other demands included the establishment
of a citizens review board to examine the distribution of revenue sharing funds and a call for the
reduction of sales taxes. Upon reaching the stadium, demonstrators heard speeches from
Abernathy, Jackson, and several other speakers. Abernathy and Jackson directed their ire at the
Nixon Administration. Jackson spoke of the need for “civil disobedience in the governors’
offices. Let it be known we’d rather eat in jail than starve in the streets.” Abernathy warned the
crowd of Nixon’s ability to cut anti-poverty programs that America’s impoverished citizens
depended on, “We have a dangerous man on our hands, by the name of King Richard the First.
We’ve got to say to Pharaoh Nixon that black people, poor people, are not going to sit idly by
198

Paul Delaney, “Rights Units Plan Nixon ‘Offensive,’” The New York Times, March 12, 1973, 17.

85

while he cuts out all the programs. We’re not going to let Mr. Nixon rebuild Hanoi and rebuild
North Vietnam when, hell, he had no business tearing it up in the first place.” 199
The SCLC failed to build on the energy generated by Abernathy and Jackson at the outset of
the “spring offensive” on Nixon’s economic policies. The Atlanta march and rally on the
anniversary of King’s death followed the same paradigm as many of Abernathy’s public
addresses at demonstrations after the split with Jackson at the end of 1971. As a reporter noted
in a Washington Post article on the decline of the SCLC, Abernathy’s speaking engagements
involved traveling to a city to “deliver a few speeches, maybe hold a rally, perhaps participate in
a march, then go somewhere else to repeat that performance. In his speeches, attacks on national
policy toward the poor get an emphasis equal to—or greater than—the local issue that brought
him in.” 200
While other members of King’s inner circle at SCLC turned their attention to different
methods in their quest to lift blacks from poverty into the middle class, Abernathy and SCLC
utilized many of the tactics that King employed a decade earlier, such as marches and fiery
rhetoric. For example, Andrew Young, executive director of SCLC under both King and
Abernathy, left the organization in 1970 to pursue a political career. By the spring of 1973,
Young worked toward enacting social change as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives,
serving Georgia’s fifth district. Although he no longer worked alongside Abernathy with the
SCLC, Young contended that he remained committed to the organization’s goals. “I’ve
obviously staked my life with politics,” Young told the Washington Post. “I hope I’m in the
movement in a new form. My commitment to the things we were struggling for in SCLC hasn’t
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swerved a bit.” 201 One month before Operation PUSH held its second annual convention in July,
Jackson explained the difference between PUSH and other civil rights organizations, such as the
SCLC, “PUSH is on the offensive. The movement has changed from traditional civil rights to
social justice. Civil rights asked the questions where shall men eat, where shall men live? Social
justice raises the questions whether men shall eat, whether men shall live.” 202
Frustrated by SCLC’s dire financial position and the organization’s struggle to raise funds
amid a crowded landscape of organizations dedicated to the advancement of civil and human
rights, Abernathy announced his resignation on July 9. In a press conference at the
organization’s headquarters, Abernathy cited SCLC’s lack of adequate finances as the reason for
his decision to step down from the organization he co-founded with King and other black
preachers in 1957, “I am resigning because of a lack of financial support which is so desperately
needed at this time to institute and carry out creative and dynamic programs in a nation in crisis.”
Abernathy blamed SCLC’s financial troubles on Coretta Scott King’s efforts to raise money for
the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Social Change, which he believed siphoned funds away
from the SCLC since King reached out to many of the same donors that SCLC targeted. The
SCLC president declared that King’s widow, “still receives 100 percent of my backing in her
work,” but Abernathy contended that the SCLC deserved a share of the funds raised by King and
the center’s staff. Abernathy informed reporters that the SCLC had a debt of $50,000 and
possessed $30,000 in assets, stocks, and bonds. 203
In addition to King’s widow, Abernathy also criticized affluent black citizens for their lack of
support. Abernathy argued that middle class black Americans earned their social status through
the organization’s “struggles and the struggles of other poor people but will not support SCLC
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financially and make it possible for this organization to meet its obligations and commitments.”
He added that, “If poor people are unable to finance the movement but can and will supply the
troops, then certainly the middle class black people who have ‘arrived’ and now receive fairly
decent salaries should supply the finances.” Abernathy told reporters that his resignation would
take effect on August 16 at the SCLC’s annual convention and he planned on devoting more time
to his position as pastor of Atlanta’s West Hunter Street Baptist Church. 204
Abernathy’s decision to resign elicited a wide variety of reactions from activists that worked
with him as well as members of the news media. Jesse Jackson told a reporter that he attempted
to reach Abernathy by phone “four or five times” after the press conference, but he failed to
connect with his former colleague. Jackson described his relationship with Abernathy as
“sound” and he added, “I have great personal concern for him. I hope that the organization will
survive his resignation. I’ll do anything I can to help.” Ben Branch, another Chicago-based
SCLC veteran, learned of Abernathy’s resignation from a reporter. Branch expressed regret after
receiving the news, “I’m sorry to hear about that. I don’t know of a person more dedicated to the
welfare of the people than Ralph Abernathy.” According to Branch, some SCLC officials never
embraced Abernathy’s leadership style, “They were looking for Ralph to be a Martin Luther
King, and he (Abernathy) kept telling them there was no way he could do that.” 205
In their assessment of Abernathy’s years of service to the SCLC and his tenure as the
organization’s president, several newspaper columnists asserted that he performed well under
very difficult circumstances. Frank L. Stanley, a Chicago Defender columnist, acknowledged
that Abernathy “had a nearly impossible task from the very outset, not only to follow MLK Jr. as
SCLC’s leader, but to hold the organization together.” Stanley agreed with Abernathy’s
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argument that middle class blacks crippled the SCLC by failing to provide financial support in
the years since King’s death. According to Stanley, “We have yet to learn that our most
successful blacks actually stand no taller than our lowliest poverty-stricken brothers and sisters
in the worst hell holes of America.” Stanley concluded with an argument that black Americans
still needed the SCLC, “We still need a well-financed, active, crusading Southern Christian
Leadership Conference even more effective than in Dr. King’s hey day. Obviously it has and
can continue to perform a service not duplicated by any other of our black-oriented civil rights
organizations.” 206
Vernon Jarrett, a black columnist for the Chicago Tribune, argued that Abernathy suffered
from the inevitable comparisons to King by the news media and black citizens. Jarrett contended
that reporters and SCLC supporters viewed King as a savior. As a result, King’s death “was
more a crucifixion than an assassination” and that the general public preferred civil rights leaders
like King, who “had become a celebrity capable of attracting other celebrities, who, in turn could
appeal to the hero-hungry black masses.” According to Jarrett, the role of “messiah” never
suited Abernathy, “I often had the feeling that he hungered for the old days, the old movement
that started in Montgomery in December, 1955, when a group of unknown, unsung, nobodies
won a monumental victory and set off the Black Revolt of the 1950s.” Jarrett expressed concern
over the effectiveness of the civil rights movement, especially if black Americans needed a
celebrity to inspire them to participate in the quest for economic opportunities and social justice.
“It is very easy to criticize the personalities of Dr. Abernathy, the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins, and
other noncharismatic [sic] leaders,” he noted. “But if the black civil rights movement must rely
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on messiahs rather than planned, consistent, grass-roots programs then civil rights activity will
become nothing more than a series of publicity stunts.” 207
Although Jarrett and Stanley argued that Abernathy fared well as SCLC president given the
tremendous challenge that came with replacing the movement’s most iconic figure, Carl Rowan
offered a dissenting opinion. In his syndicated column, Rowan contended that Abernathy lacked
the leadership skills to succeed King, “I don’t know five black people of real perception who
truly believe Abernathy should have succeeded the assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Abernathy lacked the articulation, the emotional balance, the sense of timing, the forcefulness of
personality required to maintain SCLC as a vibrant force.” Rowan asserted that, “Everyone
around knew that Andrew Young, now a congressman from Atlanta, would have made a better
successor.” In addition, Rowan believed, “Abernathy’s less-than-brilliant, not-so-inspiring
leadership is what led to the demise of SCLC.” To support this claim, Rowan cited the Poor
People’s Campaign, which he labeled “a disaster because no one could figure out what game
Abernathy was playing. The poor folks were miserable in the rain and mud while Abernathy
often was comfortable in a motel.” Rowan noted that other civil rights organizations also
struggled to remain relevant during the early 1970s. According to Rowan, SNCC and CORE “are
almost unheard of these days” while the NAACP and the National Urban League “are not giving
the same kind of leadership they once did.” He cited Abernathy’s estimation that the SCLC
would likely raise $500,000 in 1973 as evidence of the organization’s inability to generate a
mass following. Rowan declared that, “The truth is that most of the current civil rights groups
have no mass following. None of the groups is motivating and directing the mass of blacks to
take bold, meaningful steps in the interest of their own freedom.” 208
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While Rowan blamed Abernathy for SCLC’s descent into a financial crisis and cultural
irrelevancy, the organization’s staff and board of directors engaged in a frantic fundraising drive
in an attempt to persuade Abernathy to reconsider. On July 23, two weeks after Abernathy
announced his resignation, Bernard Lee arrived in Chicago to raise money for the organization.
Stressing the need to earn contributions from white donors, the SCLC’s executive assistant told
reporters that, “We are refusing Dr. Abernathy’s resignation. Our strategy is to strengthen our
national structure, not look for a new charismatic leader to head the organization.” 209 Lee listed
$25,000 as the amount he hoped to raise in the Chicago stop on a nationwide fundraising tour.
He also hinted at a possible reconciliation between Abernathy and Coretta Scott King. Lee
characterized the differences between King’s successor and his widow as “minimal” and he
added that, “If Nixon and Brezhnew can get together and if Kennedy and Wallace can get
together, I think Dr. King’s widow and his best friend will be able to iron out their problems.” 210
At the time of Lee’s fundraising trip, Abernathy clarified his criticism of Mrs. King in
remarks to a reporter. He reiterated his support for Coretta King and the work she intended to
spearhead as the King Center’s leader. Abernathy explained that his primary concern involved
the fundraising process, in which some donors might not understand the difference between the
SCLC and the King Center. Abernathy proclaimed that, “It has always been my position that
Mrs. King has every right in the world to the Martin Luther King Center for Social Change. It is
unfortunate that the public has not known there is a great deal of difference between that
organization and SCLC. It is my belief that when they give to the center they think they’re
giving to SCLC.” In addition, Abernathy expressed his belief that SCLC should handle the role
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of expanding on the work of King, “I was one of those who felt that Dr. King should be
memorialized, but I did not feel there was a need for another organization.” 211
In an interview with the same reporter, Coretta Scott King expressed her belief that, “people
who give to both organizations know the difference.” She also explained her goals for the
center, which extended beyond a memorial to her late husband, “The center has grown slowly
because we did not want to push it too quickly. We want a dynamic memorial, not a brick-andwall structure. We want something that is lasting, in the spirit of the man, in the magnitude of
the man.” When asked about the possibility that SCLC might ask Abernathy to rescind his
resignation and continue to serve as the organization’s president, King told the reporter that the
organization should accept the resignation, “Rev. Abernathy has made his resignation and I feel
it should be respected. I’m sure he has given it a lot of thought.” 212
Despite King’s belief that SCLC should accept Abernathy’s resignation and select a new
leader, officials within the organization remained persistent in their attempts to persuade him to
continue as president. Speaking alongside Abernathy at the annual conference of the
International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies on July 19, Hosea Williams
offered a grim prediction for the organization without Abernathy. After serving in the
organization’s national office with both King and Abernathy, Williams left to launch SCLC’s
Atlanta chapter. He told the crowd, “I don’t see anybody who can replace Ralph. I can’t take
the gamble on not having a brother at the national level. I know what would happen to me
without Ralph—they’d put me in jail and throw away the key.” Williams believed Abernathy
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would stay on if ordinary black citizens chose to participate in SCLC activities, “It depends on
organizing the people. Ralph will listen to the poor people.” 213
When Abernathy placed some of the blame for SCLC’s financial troubles on the black
middle class at the press conference in which he announced his resignation, he alienated
individuals within that sect of America’s black community. Three weeks before SCLC held its
16th annual convention, a group of civil rights activists and black businessmen in Chicago
expressed their frustrations with Abernathy’s tenure at the helm of SCLC. Edwin C. Berry, a
former executive director with the Chicago Urban League and fundraiser for SCLC during
King’s presidency, criticized Abernathy for a failure to reach out to potential fundraising
contacts. According to Berry, “Folks won’t give you money without being asked. They won’t
even pay a gas bill unless you send them one. And to suggest there is no one in the country to
replace him is just silly. Anyone who followed Martin [Luther King Jr.] in that job was going to
have a rough time.” Berry added that SCLC officials never asked him to raise money for the
organization despite his five-year stint as a Chicago-based fundraiser when King served as
president, “But since then I have not been asked to do one thing even tho [sic] Ralph knew the
role I had played. If he missed me in Chicago, he must have missed a lot of others.” 214
Earl B. Dickerson, one of Chicago’s prominent black businessmen, echoed Berry’s
sentiments. Dickerson cited a meeting of the city’s black businessmen, in which each individual
pledged to donate “$50 to $100 a month” to provide a financial baseline for King to come to
Chicago in 1966, as one example of support for SCLC by members of the black middle class.
He also predicted larger contributions to civil rights organizations as blacks continued to ascend
into America’s middle class, “However, I will grant that many blacks have not been responsive,
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mainly because they are catching up with the fruits of our capitalistic society. But as blacks
become experienced as middle class citizens, they give more freely.” 215
Despite skepticism of Abernathy’s claims from middle class blacks such as Berry and
Dickerson, SCLC officials believed that King’s designated successor remained the best option to
lead the organization. In addition to the public pleas for Abernathy to rescind his resignation
made by staff members such as Bernard Lee and Hosea Williams, the organization’s leaders
delayed forming a search committee for the position until one week before the convention
opened in Indianapolis. 216 Outside of Coretta Scott King and Jesse Jackson, few other
candidates received any mention as possible successors to Abernathy from the news media.
Neither King nor Jackson displayed any interest in the position. Two days before his resignation
took effect, Abernathy reiterated his claim that he knew of “no candidate on the horizon whom I
could suggest to take over the office.” 217
On August 15, following a contentious all-night meeting of SCLC’s board of directors,
chairman Joseph Lowery announced that the board rejected Abernathy’s resignation. Abernathy
subsequently agreed to continue serving as the organization’s president. Lowery announced that,
“We have prayerfully weighed all options in this crisis and have firmly concluded that at this
moment in history, Ralph David Abernathy is the man for the presidency.” In remarks to a
reporter, an unidentified SCLC official characterized the lengthy board meeting as “very
traumatic, with screaming matches and strong accusations.” One of the main points of
contention addressed in the meeting involved the makeup of SCLC’s national staff. In the weeks
between the announcement of his resignation and the convention, Abernathy suggested that part
of SCLC’s struggles resulted from the organization’s national staff, which Abernathy inherited
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from King. On the convention floor, Hosea Williams proposed a resolution that sought the
resignation of SCLC’s national staff so Abernathy could pick his own staff. The proposal never
received a vote and Abernathy pledged that he “will not ask the staff of SCLC to resign.” 218
In his address to the crowd, a rejuvenated Abernathy reaffirmed his commitment to lead
SCLC through the uncertainty that accompanied a new era of the black freedom struggle.
Abernathy proclaimed that, “I feel now that I have not only a mandate from Martin, a mandate
from God, but a mandate from Black America. Let me assure that I accept this challenge and
this responsibility.” 219
Within three years of his triumphant address in Indianapolis, Abernathy’s “mandate”
dissolved when Chauncey Eskridge, SCLC’s top fundraiser, asked Abernathy to resign at a
private dinner with several other board members. In the wake of that uncomfortable meeting,
Abernathy opted to follow Young’s example and pursue a career in politics, the new arena of
civil rights. 220
Three months before Abernathy announced his resignation in July 1973, Maynard Jackson
described the evolution of the civil rights movement to a student group at Morris Brown College.
Seeking to become Atlanta’s first black mayor, Jackson outlined his vision for the next chapter
of civil rights participation, “I think that politics is the civil rights movement of the 1970s. I
believe that it is the last nonviolent hurrah for those of us who believe we can make significant
changes within the system.” In his address, Jackson acknowledged the gains that resulted from
marches and demonstrations in the sixties. Yet he noted that the civil rights battlefield must
move from the streets into capitol buildings in order to advance the movement. According to
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Jackson, “We have seen a modulation now in the form of our protest…It is in politics now. It
says if you have enough votes, you can change how we live.” 221
Christopher P. Lehman argues that Jackson’s victory in the 1973 Atlanta mayoral election
represents the moment when the civil rights leaders of the 1960s turned away from protests and
demonstrations and embraced the potential to enact social change through politics. Jackson’s
win came on the heels of Andrew Young’s election to the U.S. House of Representatives, and
Lehman asserts that it “gave weary civil rights leaders an excuse to announce that they would
stop marching and withdraw into boardrooms and think tanks.” 222 Young believed that pursuing
a political career “seemed like a natural culmination of so much we had worked for in the sixties.
No objective of our Southern campaigns was more well focused than our voter registration
drives, which we knew would affect politics in the South forever.” 223 Yet while public office
appealed to civil rights leaders, one historian notes that in Atlanta, white businessmen wielded
enough power that both Jackson and Young realized that they needed support from this group in
order to advance policy agendas during their respective mayoral terms. 224
After Young won a third term as the representative for Georgia’s Fifth District in the fall of
1976, Jimmy Carter, fresh off his victory over Gerald Ford in the presidential election, tapped
Young to serve as America’s ambassador to the United Nations. As a result, a field of twelve
candidates entered a special election to fill Young’s congressional seat in the winter of 1977.
Abernathy announced his candidacy at a press conference on January 5. In his address to
reporters, Abernathy criticized John Lewis, executive director of the Voter Education Project,
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former SNCC chairman, a participant in the 1965 Voting Rights March, and the favorite among
the eight black candidates in the field. Abernathy contended that, “I had the privilege of bringing
John into the movement. I worked and fought in order that John Lewis and everyone would have
the right to get in the race.” In addition, Abernathy portrayed Lewis as a candidate who lacked
identifiable positions on any issues: “I really don’t know what John Lewis’s views are…His
views have been to keep a very clean office, and to see that the papers and everything else are in
place.” Abernathy also predicted that Young, his former top aide at SCLC, would endorse him
in the race. 225
In order to focus on the race, Abernathy resigned from SCLC, months after several members
of the organization’s board of directors asked him to step down in a private meeting. Years later,
Abernathy explained that his tenuous status at SCLC did not serve as the primary reason for his
decision to enter the congressional race, “Don’t misunderstand my motives in running for
Congress. I did not simply use the race as a way of bowing out, with never a thought of winning.
I wanted to win. I wanted to go to Congress—not only because it would have partially
vindicated me in my own eyes, but also because it was an opportunity to render greater service to
our people.” Yet Young’s promotion to a key position in the Carter Administration allowed
Abernathy to resign from SCLC without any public speculation regarding his departure from the
organization. 226
Abernathy’s goal throughout his tenure as SCLC president, eliminating poverty, served as the
anchor for his congressional platform. In his first press conference, Abernathy proclaimed that,
as a congressman, “I will foster a program that will eliminate ill housing; while at the same time
putting America back to work by offering tens of thousands of jobs to America’s unemployed in
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building new homes for the poor and thereby reducing crime substantially.” The other issues
Abernathy championed included providing jobs with a livable wage to “every able-bodied
American man and woman,” enhancing quality of life for senior citizens, and ensuring the
preservation of the Chattahoochee River. In addition, Abernathy listed promoting Atlanta as the
“WORLD’S NEXT GREATEST INTERNATIONAL CITY” among his goals as a congressman.
Abernathy argued that if he won the election, “This will enhance and point the way for American
[sic] and the world that Atlanta’s multi-racial society is not only a reality, but a stable
success.” 227
Abernathy’s campaign literature featured images of the multi-racial society that he advocated
in his initial press conference. Brochures that described Abernathy as “A Proven Man For All
Seasons,” contained photos of Abernathy with various dignitaries and groups. Words of praise
from Benjamin L. Hooks, Tennessee’s first black criminal judge and the incoming executive
director of the NAACP, sat just below a photograph of Abernathy addressing a table full of welldressed white citizens. A message of support from Jimmy Carter, Georgia’s biggest civic
booster outside of former Atlanta mayor William Hartsfield, occupied the space above the photo.
In addition, multiple photos of Young appeared in the brochure, including one in which the two
former SCLC staff members sat together wearing the denim outfits worn by demonstrators as
protest apparel during the sixties. The phrase, “In strategy conference with closest confidante,”
served as the photo’s caption. Another photo showed Young in a playful embrace with
Abernathy’s son Kwame, the youngest of his four children. 228 Neither Carter nor Young
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endorsed Abernathy for the open seat. The photos and messages came from Abernathy’s
previous personal correspondence with the men.
In 1977, the electorate of the Fifth District consisted of an approximately 60-40 split with
whites representing the majority. Yet Young won three consecutive congressional elections
from 1972-76 and Jackson carried the district in the 1973 mayoral election. Out of a field of 12
candidates, many observers listed two white men, Democrat Wyche Fowler, president of
Atlanta’s city council, and Republican Paul Coverdell, a state senator, and two black men,
Abernathy and Lewis, as the top contenders to advance to a runoff. David Nordan, political
editor of the Atlanta Journal, noted that both Fowler and Lewis, the two frontrunners, extolled
the virtues of a diverse district where a candidate needed a biracial coalition of voters to get
elected. According to Nordan, “the real significance of the upcoming race is that in a city in a
Deep South state where racial demagoguery and politics have been interchangeable words, every
candidate who wants to be taken seriously is walking a tightrope not to offend anyone of a
different color.” Nordan contended that the significance of appealing to a biracial coalition of
voters represented a sign of progress for the city, “This says simply that Atlantans are coming
around to the realization that their problems have no color, that they likely are more interested in
getting them solved than worrying about the race of the fellow who sits in the chair.” 229 As
historian Kevin M. Kruse demonstrated, Nordan’s depiction of Atlanta as a progressive city
where race no longer mattered in local elections does not hold up. As African Americans moved
into the city during the postwar decades, white residents fled to Atlanta’s growing suburbs.
According to Kruse, the city’s black residents accounted for just over a third of Atlanta’s total
population in 1960. By 1980, African Americans represented “a full two-thirds” of the city’s
population. Moreover, the white residents that remained inside Atlanta possessed an outsized
229
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influence on local politics since the city’s most powerful business leaders remained
overwhelmingly white. 230
From the outset of the race, Abernathy faced an uphill battle against Fowler and Lewis. As
president of Atlanta’s city council, Fowler developed a favorable reputation among the district’s
electorate and understood the dynamics of local elections. Reflecting on the race in his
autobiography, Abernathy admitted that he lacked the political skills to run an effective
campaign against Fowler, “In the first place, I had spent most of my time out on the road,
stamping out brush fires in the region, neglecting to build up a strong network of political allies
in Atlanta. I was well known, but only at a distance, whereas Wyche Fowler and the other
candidates had been shaking hands and meeting voters for years.” 231
While Fowler benefited from an intricate network of political contacts within the district,
Lewis emerged as the strongest black candidate in a race that featured eight African American
entrants. In addition to receiving endorsements from prominent members of Atlanta’s black
community, such as Maynard Jackson and Martin Luther King Sr., Lewis scored a major coup
when he earned an endorsement from Young three weeks before the March 15 election. Young’s
decision to support Lewis stunned Abernathy, who believed his former SCLC colleague would
either endorse him or remain neutral until a potential runoff occurred. A frustrated Abernathy
publicly ripped Young for what he viewed as a betrayal, “I didn’t think that he had the capacity
to stoop to this level. I was surprised and let down, because I have known him as a Christian and
sincere individual.” Abernathy added that he supported Young in prior campaigns and that
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Young “wouldn’t have gotten elected to Congress in the first place without me and the help from
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.” 232
On March 15, 1977, the election unfolded just as political reporters such as Nordan
anticipated. Fowler led all candidates with nearly 40 percent of the vote while Lewis took second
at about 29 percent and Coverdell settled for third with 21 percent. Abernathy finished a distant
fourth with just over four percent of the vote. 233 Two weeks after his defeat, Abernathy endorsed
Lewis in the runoff against Fowler. Although he claimed that race did not factor into his
decision to back Lewis, Abernathy conceded that Lewis’s civil rights activism, in which he
served “as an apostle of nonviolence” appealed to him more than Fowler’s political
experience. 234 Abernathy never again sought public office following the 1977 Fifth District race.
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CONCLUSION
Ralph David Abernathy experienced the evolution of the civil rights movement over the
course of the 1970s. At the outset of the decade, he led brief revivals of the nonviolent protests
that worked so well for SCLC in the sixties with the “March Against Repression” and the Butler
protests. The former event boosted morale among veteran SCLC activists and an interracial mix
of young demonstrators while the latter brought new jobs and expanded the influence of black
citizens in local governance in a rural corner of Alabama. Abernathy encountered the
frustrations of maintaining the fragile coalition of SCLC activists following the death of the
organization’s iconic leader and the shifting attitude toward the movement from white liberals
and middle class blacks. In the decade’s later years, Abernathy followed the lead of Andrew
Young, Maynard Jackson, and numerous other blacks who pursued their dreams of enacting
social change through public office. Over the course of seven years, Abernathy’s participation in
the civil rights struggle shifted from leading direct-action demonstrations to campaigning for the
opportunity to fight for the creation of new economic opportunities for blacks and impoverished
Americans as a public servant.
King’s death caught America off-guard, including SCLC’s staff and the organization’s loyal
supporters. Although King insisted on designating a successor three years before he died, the
organization’s staff did not prepare Abernathy for the tremendous responsibilities that came with
SCLC’s presidency. As a result, when Abernathy became the public face of SCLC, he
encountered the external pressure of executing the Poor People’s Campaign and inspiring the
American public to support a new phase of the civil rights movement centered on ambitious
102

economic objectives. In addition, Abernathy inherited a staff mired in dysfunction and he
struggled to unite a group of men with strong personalities and large egos, such as Jesse Jackson.
Although SCLC’s senior staff members agreed with Abernathy’s embrace of King’s economic
goals, his attempt to adopt King’s persona failed to resonate with the group: “Martin’s shoes
were hard to fill,” noted Andy Young. “Ralph had been handed the position of Martin’s
successor because of his genuine loyalty to Martin. I tried to support Ralph, to shore up his
weaknesses, but he was frustrated by his inability to be Martin Luther King.” Young explained
that, “No matter how I urged him to be Ralph Abernathy, the powerful preacher and committed
activist, he kept trying to imitate Martin rather than developing his own style of leading
SCLC.” 235
Furthermore, at the time of Abernathy’s ascension to SCLC president Lyndon Johnson
lacked the political capital and the desire to push Congress for legislation to meet the wholesale
economic restructuring demanded by SCLC. At the outset of the Poor People’s Campaign,
Johnson told the press of his expectation that Congress would give “due consideration” to
SCLC’s demands, but he added that “then we expect to get on running the Government as it
should be run.” 236 Three years earlier, Johnson worked with King to exert enough pressure on
Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act. Outside of fretting over the possibility of any outbreaks
of violence within Resurrection City, Johnson displayed little personal interest in working with
Abernathy and SCLC. When Richard Nixon won the 1968 presidential election, it marked the
beginning of a new era for SCLC and other civil rights organizations as they encountered an
administration opposed to both their goals and their methods of protest and civil disobedience.
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After his contentious meeting with Nixon in the midst of the Charleston strike in 1969,
Abernathy never received another audience with the president.
Although Abernathy faced the nearly impossible task of building on King’s legacy and
ushering SCLC and the black freedom struggle into a new era with more monumental gains than
the preceding decade, he made several mistakes that compounded this daunting challenge. After
stripping Jesse Jackson of his city manager post at Resurrection City and reassigning him to
Chicago, Abernathy should have realized that the organization needed to monitor the brash
preacher closely. Instead, Jackson directed Operation Breadbasket with relatively little oversight
from SCLC’s national headquarters in Atlanta, which resulted in Jackson seizing control over
Black Expo and robbing the organization of a potentially valuable source of funds. In addition,
after years as the leader of SCLC’s Chicago affiliate, Jackson successfully usurped the
organization’s support within the city’s black community when he bolted to form PUSH in 1972.
Likewise, Abernathy made the ill-advised decision to engage in a public dispute over donors and
fundraising with Coretta Scott King when she created the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for
Nonviolent Social Change. Although King’s widow turned down Abernathy’s offer of a job and
an office at SCLC following her husband’s death, finding common ground on social issues and
engaging in collaborative efforts to raise funds might have benefited both organizations in the
1970s.
Yet the fact that other prominent national civil rights organizations struggled to raise funds
and launch campaigns that resonated with the American public and produced meaningful social
and political change during the 1970s suggests that SCLC’s decline occurred as a result of
numerous factors in addition to Abernathy’s leadership deficiencies. When Abernathy
announced his resignation in 1973, Vernon Jarrett asserted that King emerged as the central
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figure in a series of grassroots campaigns “which the media and a celebrity-hungry public
converted into a one-man movement.” 237 Yet even King failed to build off the successes of the
mid-1960s, which culminated with the Selma-to-Montgomery march three years before his
death. For close to a decade after his predecessor’s untimely death, Abernathy fought to advance
the cause that King gave his life for. In the end, the obstacles proved insurmountable for King’s
“alter ego.” 238
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